North Dakota Law Review
Volume 64

Number 1

Article 1

1988

North Dakota Waterways: The Public's Right of Recreation and
Questions of Title
Charles M. Carvell

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carvell, Charles M. (1988) "North Dakota Waterways: The Public's Right of Recreation and Questions of
Title," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol64/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

NORTH DAKOTA WATERWAYS: THE PUBLIC'S
RIGHT OF RECREATION AND QUESTIONS OF TITLE
CHARLES

M.

CARVELL*

I. INTRODUCTION ............................
II. THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO USE WATERWAYS
OVERLYING PUBLIC PROPERTY ..............
A. INTRODUCTION ...........................
11
B. DEFINITION OF NAVIGIBILITY FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING TITLE ..................
....
13
FOR
C. NORTH DAKOTA AND THE-NAVIGABILITY
T ITLE T EST . ..............................
21
D. NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS IN NORTH DAKOTA .....
25
E. CONSEQUENCES OF TITLE NAVIGABILITY FOR THE.
NORTH DAKOTA RECREATIONIST ..............

F.

THE-VALIDITY OF SECTION

47-01-15

OF THE.NORTH

DAKOTA CENTURY CODE ...................

-

40

A.

INTRODUCTION ...........................

48

B.

TITLE TO THE-BEDS OF NONNAVIGABLE WATERWAYS

48

C.

THE-NATURE OF A RIPARIAN'S INTEREST IN THE.

D.

11

30

III. THE PUBLIC'S RGHT TO USE WATERWAYS
OVERLYING PRIVATE PROPERTY ............

SOIL OF NONNAVIGABLE WATERWAYS ...........

.8

48

49

THEORIES SUPPORTING PUBLIC RECREATIONAL
RIGHTS IN WATERWAYS OVERLYING PRIVATE

PROPERTY .............................. 53

E.

THE SCOPE OF THE.PUBLIC'S RECREATIONAL

R IGHTS ................................

IV. CONCLUSION ..............................

66
71

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64:7

I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes between water recreationists and North Dakota
landowners are common. A person may own land under and on
each side of a river. In this situation, some landowners claim
ownership of the water. Others, while not asserting ownership,
claim exclusive control of the Water. Canoeists, fishermen, iceskaters, and other recreationists are viewed by both groups of
landowners as trespassers.
Disputes over the right to use North Dakota rivers commonly
occur. For example, a longstanding feud exists between the public
and a landowner on the Cannonball River where the river flows
through the small town of Mott. The landowner has sought
criminal prosecution of people who fish from the Cannonball where
it flows over his property. The local states attorney, however,
refuses to prosecute. In 1986, however, the Stark County States
Attorney prosecuted two hunters for criminal trespass for using
Antelope Creek where it flows over private property.I
Recreationist/landowner disputes often arise on the Souris
River, perhaps because it is a substantial body of water flowing
through Minot, one of North Dakota's largest cities. Disputes
involving other waterways have also occurred. Recently, canoeists
removed a fence across the Heart River. Fishermen in boats iave
been ordered out of Antler Creek in Bottineau County. Apple
Creek in Burleigh County has been the scene of conflicts between.
landowners and canoeists, snowmobilers, and children playing on
the river bank. The numerous inquiries about the public's right to
use rivers received by the State Game and Fish Department each
year is indicative of the confusion involving waterway rights. 2
The conflict between landowners and recreationists is not
always well-mannered. The attorney for one of the landowners
involved in the Apple Creek problems stated that his client finds
effective resolution by pointing a shotgun at recreationists. 3 Some
recreationists have cut barbed wire fences that landowners place
across streams to manage their livestock. While recreationists view
the fence cutting as the lawful removal of an illegal obstruction,
landowners see it as unlawful destruction of private property.

1. Telephone interview with Owen Mehrer, Stark County States Attorney (Oct. 30, 1987). The
creek is usually only boatable during the spring and after heavy rains. Id. Therefore, the creek was
determined to be nonnavigable and thus private property. Id.
2. Letter from State Game and Fish Commissioner, Dale Henegar, to Attorney General
Nicholas Spaeth (Mar. 23, 1986) (discussing inquiries about public's use of rivers).
3. Conversation with a Bismarck attorney (Mar. 23, 1987).
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Each side in the conflict makes reasonable arguments for its
position. Users of waterways point out that North Dakota has
limited recreational resources. Indeed, it is true that recreational
water resources in the state are not abundant. 4 Furthermore,
recreationists contend that with the state's population growing and
people's leisure time increasing, there is greater demand for
recreational water resources. Recreationists believe that if the state
is to provide a satisfying place to live, its waterways must not be
closed to cross-country skiers, canoeists, ice-skaters, fishermen,
and other users. Besides, the recreationists argue, their activities
are nonconsumptive and do not harm the riparian landowner.
On the other hand, landowners say users abuse the resource.
They argue that the public disrupts the aesthetics of the waterfront
and the landowner's solitude. Trash is left on river banks and in the
water. Irrigation hoses are cut by boat propellers. Tree branches
5
are broken off for building fires on the river banks or on the ice.
Moreover, some landowners express concerns about being sued if a
recreationist is injured while using adjacent water. The cost of a
landowner's liability insurance may increase if the public has the
right to use water flowing over the landowner's property.
The controversy concerning water rights is likely to increase.
In a relatively short time span North Dakotans have become more
urban and recreation demanding. Studies expose the inadequacy of
the state's recreational water resources and the increasing demand
for these resources. For example, the State Water Commission
stated that "[t]he demand for water related outdoor recreation
exceeds available opportunities in many areas of the State. "6 The
North Dakota Parks and Recreation Department reports that
between 1985 and 2000 the number of canoeists in the state is
projected to rise from 40,122 to 45,716, the number of fishermen
from 265,834 to 302,884, and the number of ice-skaters from

4. North Dakota has 897,920 acres of lakes, rivers, and reservoirs. NORTH DAKOTA PARKS AND
RECREATION DEPARTMENT, 1985 NORTH DAKOTA STATE COMPREHENSIVE OUTDOOR RECREATION PLAN

13 (1985). Yet, the state's "water resources are few and far between," with apparently only two
percent of the state having water acreage. Id. at 60. Furthermore, much of the shoreline of state
rivers and lakes "has limited public access." Id.
5. For an example of the acute problems a riparian landowner may encounter if the public is
given the right to use adjacent water, see Botton v. State, 69 Wash. 2d 751, __,
420 P.2d 352, 35354 (1966) (fair market value of property decreased, increase of thievery, greatly increased pollution,
frequent trespasses, illegal hunting, noise increase, public use of property interfered with private
party's use and enjoyment of property).
6. NORTH DAKOTA STATE WATER COMMISSION, 1983 STATE WATER PLAN V-2. The primary
purpose of the State Water Plan is "to reassess North Dakota's long-term water requirements in a
context of rapidly changing times and values..... Id. at 1-2.
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78,923 to 89,929. 7 Canoeing and fishing on North Dakota rivers is
'more popular than ever. "8
The quarrel between users of North Dakota waterways and
riparian landowners exists because neither the North Dakota
Legislature nor North Dakota Supreme Court has adequately
specified rights in regard to waterways. A few supreme court
decisions along with several statutes and a constitutional provision
are, however, useful. This Article analyzes such sources, as well as
case law from other jurisdictions and concludes the public has a
legal right to use waterways flowing over privately owned land.
An old recipe for rabbit stew began with the instruction: "First
catch your rabbit." This Article must, before discussing public
recreational rights in waterways over private property, start with a
similar truism. In order to examine waterway rights, it must first be
determined which submerged lands in the state are privately owned
and which are owned by the state. Whether the state or a private
party has title to a body of water depends upon whether the body of
water is navigable. 9 Thus, the first part of this Article discusses
navigability as the concept is used for purposes of determining title
to submerged land. It also discusses the public's recreational rights
7. NORTH DAKOTA PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT, supra note 4, at 38; see- also J.
MITTLEIDER, H. VREUGDENHIL, D. HELGESON & D. SCOTT, PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN
OUTDOOR RECREATION FOR NORTH DAKOTA, 1978 TO 1995 457-58 (1980) (North Dakota State
University Agricultural Economics Report No. 140) (projecting future numbers of participants and
days of participation in outdoor recreation in North Dakota); 1 MISSOURI BASIN INTER-AGENCY
COMMITTEE, THE, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK STUDY 137-40 (1969)
(projecting future outdoor recreation demands for the Missouri Basin). Significant deficiencies in
water recreation opportunities have been projected to occur in the Red and Souris River basins.
SOURIS-RED-RAINY RIVER BASINS COMMISSION, SOURIS-RED-RAINY RIVER BASINS COMPREHENSIVE
STUDY, 1-7, 1-43, 1-83,J-73 (1972).
8. NORTH DAKOTA PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT, supra note 4, at 13.
9. The term "navigability" must be used with caution because it is subject to significant
misunderstanding. To state that a river is navigable is meaningless unless one clarifies in which of the
various contexts the term is used. These contexts include:
a. The federal test of navigability for determining title to submerged lands. See Utah

v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971).
b. Federal tests of navigability for carrying out federal regulatory jurisdiction. See
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 796(8) (1982); Clean Water Act, 22 U.S.C. §

1362(7) (1982); River and Harbor Act of 1894, 33 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); 33 C.F.R. §
329.4 (1987).
c.

State tests of navigability for determining title to submerged lands. Lamprey v.
Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 198, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893); Roberts v. Taylor, 47

N.D. 146, 152-56, 181 N.W. 622, 625-26 (1921).
d.

State tests for determining which rivers with privately owned beds are navigable
and, therefore, subject to public use. See People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040,

e.

State tests for determining recreational rights of riparians in water over private
property. See Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 166-67, 100 N.W.2d 689, 695

1044-50, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 450-53 (1971).
(1960).
f.

State tests of navigability in statutes adopted for various purposes. See, e.g., N.D.
CENT. CODE § 61-15-01(1) (1985) (definitions concerning state law regulating
water conservation).
g. The federal test for determining admiralty jurisdiction. See The Montello, 87 U.S.

(20 Wall.) 430, 438, 445 (1874).
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in water over state-owned property. These rights are broader and
more crisply defined than are the rights in water over private
property. The first part of the Article also considers a title question
that is important for public rights in navigable waters. This is the
effect and validity of section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code which provides that a riparian landowner on a navigable lake
or stream owns land to the low-water mark.10 The second part of
the Article discusses the public's right on waterways over private
property. 11
II. THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO USE WATERWAYS
OVERLYING STATE LAND
A.

INTRODUCTION

After the American Revolution each colony became sovereign.
As sovereigns, the colonies held "the absolute right to all their
navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common
use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution
to the general government." 1 2 Since the beds of navigable waters
were not surrendered by the United States Constitution to the
3
federal government, they were retained by the states.1
New states admitted to the Union are entitled to the same
rights as those held by the original states. 14 This concept is
commonly referred to as the equal footing doctrine.15 Pursuant to
10. N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-01-15 (1978).
11. The term "waterways" refers to rivers as well as lakes in this Article. The principles
discussed apply to both rivers and lakes even though a particular discussion, for reasons of style, may
only refer to rivers or to lakes.
This Article does not address public recreational rights in artificially created bodies of water.
Such bodies have a unique status and the principles discussed and conclusions reached here do not
necessarily apply to manmade waterways. For a discussion of rights relating to manmade waterways,
see Corbridge, Surace Rights in Artificial Watercourses, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 887 (1984); Evans,
RiparianRights inArtificialLakes and Streams, 16 Mo. L. REV. 93 (1951); Note, Artificial Versus Natural
Fluctuation of Water Level of Navieable Lake - Rights of Public Held Same in Both Situations, 5 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 517 (1970).
12. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
13. Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867). In rare instances the federal
government made prestatehood land transfers to private individuals that included the beds of
navigable waters. E.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 219-20 (1845). There is, however, a
presumption against the intent to convey the bed of a navigable waterway and any such grant must,
be clear and unequivocal. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47-48, 58 (1894). The extent
of a prestatehood grant to a riparian was the issue in State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 185, 20 N.W.2d
668, 668-69 (1945).
14. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229-30. In Pollard,the plaintiffs sought to recover land beneath
navigable waters of Mobile Bay in Alabama, claiming title pursuant to an act of Congress and a
patent from the United States issued prior to the time Alabama was granted statehood. Id. at 219-20.
The United States Supreme Court determined that new states are entitled to the same sovereignty as
held by the original states. Id. at 229-30. The Court concluded that because original states own soil
under navigable waters, Alabama at statehood owned soil under its navigable waters. Id. at 230.
Therefore, the federal patent was insufficient to convey title to the plaintiffs. Id.
15. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2318, 2324 (1987) (requiring a
showing of express congressional intent in order to defeat a future state's title under the equal footing
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this principle, upon admission a new state owned, just as the
original states did, the beds of navigable waterways within its
17
boundaries. 1 6 This ownership extended to the high-water mark.
Prior to admission, the federal government held these lands in trust
for the benefit of future states and their citizens. 18 North Dakota
entered the Union in 1889.19 Thus, North Dakota owns the soil of
all waterways navigable in 1889. If a body of water is
nonnavigable, ownership of the -bed is generally held by the
2
riparians . 0
State ownership of the soil beneath waterways navigable at
statehood is a simple concept. Application of the idea, however, is
sometimes difficult. It is not always easy to determine the
navigability of a particular river or lake. There is no one alive today
with firsthand knowledge of a waterway's characteristics and uses
when North Dakota entered the Union. Records of such matters
are likely incomplete. Some parts of the state were sparsely settled
in 1889, making it unlikely any records even exist of the local
rivers. Even so, proving the navigability of a river at statehood is
not impossible and in light of judicial decisions, particularly recent
ones liberalizing the burden of proof, it is likely that a fair number
of riverbeds are owned by the state.
doctrine to land under navigable waters); Shively, 152 U.S. at 57 (stating the equal footing principle,
without referring to it as such, establishes state title to soil beneath tide waters to the high-water
mark); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) (extending the equal footing doctrine from tidal
to nontidal waters); Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 467, 37 N.W.2d 488, 490 (1949)
(stating that title of the United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the state passes to
the state as incident to local sovereignty).
North Dakota's ownership of the beds of its navigable waters is confirmed by the Submerged
Lands Act of 1953. 43 U.S.C. §S 1301, 1311, 1313-15 (1982); North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. &
School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 275 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Block v.
State
Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983); see also Oregon ex rel.
North Dakota ex rel.
Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 371 n.4 (1977) (Submerged Lands Act
confirms state title to the beds of navigable waters within their boundaries). For an explanation of the
Submerged Lands Act, see United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 6-11 (1960). The right of a state
to the beds of its navigable waters is subject to the federal government's authority to regulate such
waters for commerce and interstate navigation. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551
(1981), reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 911 (1981). A recent explanation of the federal government's
navigational servitude is contained in United States v. Cherokee Nation. of Okla., 107 S.Ct. 1487,
1490-91 (1987).
17. Shively, 152 U.S. at 26.
18. Utah Div. of State Lands, 107 S. Ct. at 2320; State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 190, 20 N.W.2d 668,
671 (1945).
19. The Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889), reprinted in N.D. CENT. CODE vo1. 13, at ch.
63 (1981). The first paragraph of the Act provides that North Dakota is "to be admitted into the
Id.
union on an equal footing with the original states...."
20. State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 317, 36 N.W.2d 330, 332 (1949); Beck, Boundary Litigation and
Legislation in North Dakota, 41 N.D.L. REV. 424, 438 (1965). Although the ownership of a
nonnavigable waterway is usually held by the riparian, where a federal patent to riparian land on
waterways nonnavigable under the federal test fails to make an express grant of title to the abutting
bed, there is an intriguing argument that North Dakota owns the bed. Davis, State Ownership of Beds of
Inland Waters - A Summary and Reexamination, 57 NEB. L. REV. 655, 698-99 (1978). If it is a sound
theory upon which this idea is based, then North Dakota owns more land - perhaps a considerable
amount - than it realizes.
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DEFINITION OF NAVIGABILITY FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING TITLE

Title to beds of navigable waters arises under the United
States Constitution, and therefore navigability is a question of
federal law. 2 1 The definition of navigability for determining title to
submerged lands was set forth in 1870 by the United States
Supreme Court in The Daniel Ball. 22 In The Daniel Ball, the Court
stated:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers
in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable
in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water. 23

Although The Daniel Ball concerned federal admiralty
jurisdiction, its definition of navigability has been adopted for
purposes of title navigability. 24 The definition contains several
25
elements that are set apart and discussed in the following section.
1. "Those rivers must be regardedas public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable infact. "26
21. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). Since the matter arises under the
Constitution, it cannot be subject to varying local rules because this would allow the Constitution to
have a diversified operation. See Davis, supra note 20, at 669. Prior to 1922, however, it was widely
believed that a state test, rather than the federal test of navigability, was to be used in determining
title to beds of waterways. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
22. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
23. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). The definition of navigability also
applies to lakes. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971).
24. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 15
(1935); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922). Use of The Daniel
Ball, an admiralty jurisdiction case, to define navigability for title, represents the judicial practice of
drawing on several lines of navigability cases to answer title and commerce clause questions. For
example, the title case of United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 81 (1931), relies on Economy Light &
Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921), a case interpreting navigability fdr purposes of the
Rivers and Harbor Act of 1899. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 147
F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1945), a commerce clause case, relies in part on the title case of Oklahoma v.
Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922). This practice of relying upon commerce clause cases in title cases, and
vice versa, is said to be "disconcerting." Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on
Western Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 15 (1967). While it may not be conducive to
jurisprudential purity, the practice is well established and, if limited to the areas in which the cases
are truly parallel, it is legitimate. While recognizing that the several lines of navigability cases are not
absolutely interchangeable, this Article follows the practice. For a discussion of the general
distinction between navigability for title and for commerce clause purposes, see Davis, supra note 20,
at 670.
25. For discussions of the navigability title test, see Frank, Forever Free: Navigability, Inland
Waterways, and the Expanding Public Interest, 16 U.C.DAVis L. REV. 579, 583-604 (1983); Johnson &
Austin, supra note 24, at 8-33.
26. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
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Determining the navigability of a waterway is a question of
fact. Legislative pronouncements are not conclusive. The North,
Dakota Supreme Court, in a case involving a dispute between the
state and a littoral landowner over ownership of a lake bed, stated
that a legislative declaration that a lake is navigable will not make it
so if it is not navigable in fact. 27 As the Indiana Supreme Court
noted: "Nature is competent, we should imagine, to make a
navigable river without the help of the legislature.' '28 Furthermore,
analogies between rivers are not always helpful. The navigability of
several Utah rivers was at issue in United States v. Utah. 29 In United
States v. Utah, the United States sought a ruling of
nonnavigability.3 0 The United States invited a comparison between
the Utah rivers and rivers in New Mexico and Oklahoma that had
been declared nonnavigable. 1 The Court declined to do so, stating
that "[elach determination as to navigability must stand on its own
facts.' '32
2. Rivers "are navigable infact when they are used... as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in customary modes of trade or travel on water. "33
A waterway must have been used or susceptible of being used
as a highway of commerce. Commerce is defined as the
transportation of people or goods. 3 4 It is not necessary that the
commerce be international or even interstate. 35 It is sufficient that
the river be useful for trade and travel in the local area. 36 This is
because
the
feature distinguishing
navigability
from
nonnavigability is usefulness as a highway. 37 Therefore, so long as
the waterway has usefulness as a highway, it is inconsequential
whether it leads to another country or to another state. In one
instance, trade between Indian tribes on a river contributed to a
finding of navigability. 38 In another case, the United States
27. State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 318, 36 N.W.2d 330, 332-33 (1949); see also State v.
Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623,
-, 503 P.2d 1231, 1238 (1972) (stating that a statutory list of navigable
waters was not determinative of whether river was navigable).
28. Martin v. Bliss, 5 Blackf. 35,
-, 32 Am.Dec. 52, 52 (Ind. 1838).
29. 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
30. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 71-72 (1931).
31. Id. at87.
32. Id.
33. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
34. Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 464-65 (D. Alaska 1987).
35. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75

(1931).
36. Doyon, Ltd., 86 Interior Dec. 692, 697, 700-01 (1979).
37. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 11.
38. Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. at 467.
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Supreme Court determined that the use of a lake by a few ranchers
to transport livestock to and from an island was sufficient to find the
lake,useful as a commercial highway.3 9
Navigability, however, will not be denied even when the use of
the waterway is not commercial, but is personal and private. 40 Such
use is capable of demonstrating the capacity of the stream for
commercial navigation. In a recent decision the federal district
court in Alaska considered whether the state or the federal
government had title to the bed of the Gulkana River.4 1 Regarding
the question of what constitutes commerce, the court appeared to
accept Alaska's argument that commerce is not confined to freight
hauling, but might include activities such as fishing, camping,
sightseeing, trapping, hunting, and governmental activities such as
surveying. 42 The court also stated commerce is to be defined in its
"most elemental form" and a "court need only inquire if the
waterbody is susceptible to the most basic form of commercial use:
the transportation of people or goods.' '4 In North Dakota v. Hoge, in
which North Dakota claimed title to the bed of Painted Woods
Lake, the court determined the lake was navigable even though it is
only 200 to 800 feet wide, two miles long, and two to four feet
deep. 4 4 Evidence proved that parts of the lake shore were populated
in 1889, the year North Dakota entered the Union. 45 By citing this
fact the court seems to imply that it is likely the people used the lake
46
in their ordinary affairs, thus making it a highway of commerce.
Other evidence of the lake's navigability was use of the lake in the
early 1900s for recreational boating, fishing, and hunting. 47 Also,
entrepreneurs operated excursion boats on the lake, 48 one of which
was a bordello.
The interpretation of "customary mode of trade or travel on
water" also provides courts with flexibility when determining
whether a waterway is navigable. 4 9 Navigability does not depend
on a particular mode of trade or travel.5 0 Evidence that steamers or
39. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 1 I. But see Monroe v. State, I ll Utah 1, __,
175 P.2d
759, 761-62 (1946) (finding an isolated mountainous lake nonnavigable).
40. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940); Utah v. United
States, 403 U.S. at 11; United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931); Doyon, Ltd., 86 Interior Dec.
at 702.
41. Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. at 456.
42. Id. at 465.
43. Id.
44. Order at 2, 5, North Dakota v. Hoge, No. A1-83-42, (S.W.D. N.D. Feb. 28, 1984).
45. See id. at 4.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405-06 (1940).
50. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
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sailing ships used the water is not necessary.5 1 "If this were so, the
public would be deprived of the use of many of the large rivers of
the country.... ,,52 Livestock boats, barges, tourist excursion craft,
keelboats, flatboats, lumber rafts, pole boats, tunnel boats,
outboard river boats and a variety of smaller craft, such as canoes
and row boats, have been considered as customary modes of water
53
transport.
Furthermore, the floating of logs down a river has also been
construed as a customary mode of transport. 54 Even the use of a
river to float objects smaller than logs has been sufficient to
55
establish a customary mode of transport.
3. Rivers "are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used... as highwaysfor commerce.... "56
While historical evidence of a river's use as a highway of
57
commerce is persuasive proof of navigability, it is unnecessary.
Susceptibility of use, rather than the manner or extent of actual use
58
is the vital issue.
51. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1878).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971) (use of boats for moving livestock
sufficient to establish lake as a highway of commerce). United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377, 411-17 (1940) (keelboats and other river craft used to transport lumber, tobacco,
and other products down the New River sufficient evidence to establish navigability); Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. at 57 (small boats used for trade and travel required finding of navigability); North Dakota
ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 278 (8th Cir. 1982) ("canoe travel at
the time of North Dakota's statehood represented a viable means of transporting persons and
goods"), rev'd on other grounds sub. noin., Block v. North Dakota ex rel Bd. of Univ. & School Lands,
461 U.S. 273 (1983); Doyon, Ltd., 86 Interior Dec. 692, 705 (1979) (use of pole boats, tunnel boats,
and outboard riverboats constituted customary modes of trade). In Alaska v. United States, Alaska
argued that Slopbucket Lake was navigable because float-planes used it to land and take off. Alaska
v. United States, 754 F.2d 851, 852 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985). The court
disagreed since the central theme of navigability is the movement of people and goods from point to
point on water. Id. at 854.
54. Appalachian Elec. Power, 311 U.S. at 411; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul
Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349, 359 (1897); Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power'
Comm'n, 557 F.2d 349, 357 (2d Cir. 1977); Wisconsin v. Federal Power Comm'n, 214 F.2d 334,
337 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954); Andrus, 506 F. Supp. at 623 (D.N.D. 1981),
aff'd, 671 F.2d 271, 278 (8th Cir. 1982); Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792, 79495 (9th Cir. 1982); State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, -. , 503 P.2d 1231, 1236 (1972).
In Andrus, proof of navigability was established in part by a logging operation. Andrus, 506 F.
Supp. at 623. In 1881 and 1882, rail ties were cut near Marmath, North Dakota, and floated down
the Little Missouri. Id. In Riverfront Protection Ass'n, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
applied logging as the sole test for determining title navigability of the McKenzie River. Riverfront
Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d at 794-95. The river was found navigable even though the logging was done
only during the spring months and although many difficulties were encountered, such as shallow
waters and intractable log jams that had to be broken by dynamite. Id.
55. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 644 F.2d 785, 788
(9th Cir. 1981). In Puget Sound Power & Light Co., the utility challenged the agency's finding that the
White River in Washington was navigable. Id. The court upheld the agency, finding navigability in
the river's use by Indian canoes and for the floatation of log sections about four and a half feet long.
Id.
56. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
57. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931).
58. Id. at 82, 83; Doyon, Ltd., 86 Interior Dec. 692, 699 (1979).
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The rationale for this liberal "susceptibility rule" is that
commercial use at the time of admission to the Union may be
nonexistent. A state "is not to be denied title to the beds of such of
its rivers as were navigable in fact at the time of the admission of
the State either because the location of the rivers and the
circumstances of the exploration and settlement of the country
through which they flowed had made recourse to navigation a late
adventure.... ,,59

Thus,

where

conditions of exploration

and

settlement explain infrequent or limited use, it may be impossible
to prove commercial use. For example, although North Dakota
became a state in 1889, its western region was sparsely settled until
the 1900s.
Susceptibility as a commercial highway may be shown several
ways. An examination of a river's physical characteristics may
prove it is capable of sustaining commerce. 60 If a river's present
characteristics make it useful for commerce, and if hydrological and
survey evidence or other technical proof show that present
characteristics are similar to those at the time statehood was
61
granted, then an element of navigability is proven.
The issue of the navigability of several shallow lakes in Oregon
62
arose in the 1930s and was litigated in United States v. Oregon.
Oregon was admitted to the Union in 1859.63 To prove that the
physical condition of the lakes had not varied substantially from
1859 to the 1930s, the following scientific and historical evidence
was considered: early maps and reports; a study of tree rings
indicating past climatic conditions, particularly the amount of
annual rainfall; and the presence of underlying beds of peat that
tended to establish shallow water conditions and the presence of
vegetation over a long period. 64 Based on this evidence, the court
determined that the physical condition of the lakes had not changed
substantially since the admission of Oregon to the Union and,
therefore, concluded that since the lakes were presently not
susceptible to use as a commercial highway, title to land beneath
65
the lakes belonged to the United States.
59. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 83; see also Doyon, Ltd., 86 Interior Dec. at 699
(interpreting the Court's opinion in United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), as broadening,
rather than constricting, the scope of evidence which may be considered in determining navigability
of a water body).
60. Uniied States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 410-13 (1940); United States
v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 83; The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874); Alaska v. United
States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Alaska 1987).
61. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 83; Lovingv. Alexander, 548 F.Supp. 1079, 1089 (W.D.
Vsr 1982).
62. 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
63. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 6 (1935).
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 18,29.
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Another method to prove susceptibility of commercial use is by
experimentation. If a river can be used in its present condition for
commercial travel, and its condition is largely unchanged since
statehood, this will prove its susceptibility for commercial use at
statehood. 66 In North Dakota ex rel. Board of University & School Lands
v. Andrus, 6 7 for example, title to the bed of North Dakota's Little
Missouri River was litigated. The state sought relief from
actions of the federal agencies engaged in proprietary actions including leasing the riverbed for oil and gas development incompatible with North Dakota's claim of ownership to the river
bed. 68 The river was declared navigable by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 69 Part of the proof of navigability was the present
day use of the Little Missouri by 200 canoeists annually.7 0 Since
"canoe travel at the time of North Dakota's statehood represented
a viable means of transporting persons and goods," 7 1 modern day
canoe travel proved the river's navigability in 1889.
If evidence of historical commercial use exists, it is
unnecessary that this evidence be confined to just the year of
statehood. Such evidence is acceptable even if it arises in years long
66. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 83 (stating that the capacity of riverq in their ordinary
condition to meet the needs of commerce as these needs arise in connection with lpopulation growth
may be shown by physical characteristics and experimentation).
67. 671 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'don othergroundssub nor., Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd.
of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983). In this case the United States Supreme Court's
reversal was on jurisdictional grounds. Block 461 U.S. at 292. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit's, as well
as the district court's decision is technically without precedential value, something recognized by the
Eighth Circuit in later and related litigation. See North Dakota, ex rd. Bd. of Univ. and School
Lands v. Block, 789 F.2d 1308, 1314 (8th Cir. 1986). Nonetheless, this Article often cites the original
decision because it may guide a court's analysis on navigability questions.
68. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir.
1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 461
U.S. 273 (1983).
69. Andrus, 671 F.2d at 278. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that evidence of
the Little Missouri's navigability was "thin," but added the standards of navigability "are liberal."
Id. A. Department of Interior decision states:
[R]ecreational use, of itself, may not suffice to meet the susceptibility
test... .Present use for recreation purposes may be properly considered as a
corroborating factor in determining susceptibility for use as a highway of
commerce.... []f the type of watercraft used for recreation is capable of carrying a
commercial load, and is commonly used to do so, then use of such watercraft offers
some indication that the waterway is capable of being used for the purpose of useful
commerce.
Doyon, Ltd., 86 Interior Dec. 692, 706 (1979).
70. Andrus, 671 F.2d at 278.
71. id. In St. Lawrence Shores, Inc. v. State, the Court of Claims of New York interpreted a New
York statute that defined navigable waters much as it is defined in the federal navigability title test.
See St. Lawrence Shores, Inc. v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 74, -, 302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 612-13 (N.Y. Ct.
Cl. 1969). The court stated navigability may be proven by present day use of pleasure boats. Id. at
- 302 N.Y.S.2d at612.
At issue in Loving o. Alexander was the Corps of Engineers' determination that Virginia's.Jackson
River was navigable. Loving v. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079, 1081-82 (W.D. Va. 1982).
Testimony of witnesses who boated the river in canoes helped prove it susceptible for commercial
navigation by simple modes of water transport. Id. at 1089.
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before or long after the year of admission to the Union. For
example, in Utah v. United Utah, 72 Utah sought to prove the
navigability of the Great Salt Lake. 73 Its proof was that in the 1870s
the lake was used for commerce. 74 The federal government
responded by arguing that since Utah became a state in 1896,
activities on the lake in the 1870s were irrelevant. 75 Nonetheless,
proof of the lake's previous use helped convince the Court that the
lake was navigable in 1896.76 Similarly, in Andrus, evidence of a
1804 canoe journey down the river was used in conjunction with
present day canoe use to prove navigability. 77 Other cases have also
relied on the use of a river by explorers to prove navigability. 7
Thus, even though evidence of commercial usefulness may come
from years long before or long after statehood, it should always be
admissible so long as some other evidence shows that characteristics
of the waterway are not substantially different than at statehood.
4. Rivers "are navigable in fact when they are used... in their
ordinary condition, as highways of commerce."79
The definition of navigability for title requires that the
susceptibility for commercial travel exist in the river's "ordinary
condition." "Ordinary condition" refers to volume of water,
gradients, and regularity of flow. 80 The presence of obstructions
making navigation difficult, such as sandbars, shallow waters, and
rapids does not mean a river is nonnavigable.8 1 Nor does a river
need to be navigable year round.8 2 For instance, it may be
navigable for as little as two and a half months a year.8 3 Thus, a
72. 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
73. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 9 (1971).
74. Id. at 11-12.
75. See id. at 12.
76. Id.
77. North Dakota ex tel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 277-78 (8th Cir.
1982), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom., Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 461
U.S. 273 (1983); see also Newcomb v. Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d 393, 399, 60 P.2d 825, 828 (1936)
(testimony by witnesses who were not familiar with the waterway at the time California became a
state, but who testified to the condition of the waterways at a later date was relevant in determining
the waterway's status at an earlier time); Ord Land Co. v. Alamitos Land Co., 199 Cal. 380, 385,
249 P. 178, 180 (1926) (evidence of an area's characteristics in 1877 was admissible to determine its
characteristics in 1850, the date of statehood).
78. E.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 82; The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 440
(1874); Illinois v. Corps of Engineers, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2214, 2215 (N.D. Il. 1981).
79. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
80. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407 (1940).
81. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 84-87; Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States,
256 U.S. 113, 122 (1921); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 442-43; Alaska v. United States, 662
F. Supp. 455, 468 n.13 (D. Alaska 1987).
82. Doyon, Ltd., 86 Interior Dec. 692, 698 (1979). In Dovon. Ltd.. the Alaskan rivers at issue
were frozen seven months of the year and were yet determined to be navigable. Id.
83. Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1982).
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river that is periodically dry or is frozen for a number of months
does not necessarily lose its navigability. In addition, navigation
soley downstream is sufficient to demonstrate navigability.8 4
North Dakota's Little Missouri River was determined
navigable even though it is more often impassable than it is
navigable. 5 The river tends to be high during spring flood periods,
86
at times quite low in the summer, and frozen during winter.
Furthermore, there was evidence the river's maximum depth is but
two and a half feet. 8 7 The crucial issue, however, "is whether the
natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a channel for
useful commerce." ' 88 Yet, if navigable only during times of high
is of short
water and if this high water appears irregularly and
89
duration, navigability is less likely to be established.
Since a river's "ordinary condition" determines navigability,
improvements to the river to allow navigation, such as dredging,
should be ignored in the navigability analysis. 90 An improvement,
however, that does not alter the natural condition does not prohibit
a finding of navigability. 91 For example, in Oregon v. Riverfront
ProtectionAssociation92 the court noted that the McKenzie River was
sometimes deepened for log driving by construction of "wing
crude
dams." ' 93 These wing dams, however, were considered
94
condition.
river's
the
change
to
insufficient
and
structures
5. Conclusion
The test for title navigability is not a strict one. Its elements
are provable without herculean effort. The tenor of judicial
decisions on the subject, particularly recent ones, favors a finding
of navigability and placing ownership of subaqueous soil in the
84. Id.; Sierra Pacific Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 681 F.2d 1134, 1138'
-,
503 P.2d 1231, 1236 (1972); see also
(9th Cir. 1982); State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623,
Miami Valley Conservancy Dist. v. Alexander, 692 F.2d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 1982).
85. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1982),
rev'don other grounds sub nom., Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S.,
273 (1983).
86. Andrus, 671 F.2d at 278.
87. Id. at 277.
88. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 443 (1874).
89. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 589 (1922); United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698-99 (1899).
90. Economy Light & Power Co.v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 122-23 (1921); Brewer-Elliott
Oil & Gas Co.v. United States, 270 F. 100, 102-03 (8th Cir. 1920), aff'd, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); State
v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 321, 36 N.W.2d 330, 334 (1949); Bissel v. Olson, 26 N.D. 60, 64, 143
N.W. 340, 341 (1913).
91. Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792, 795-96 (9th Cir. 1982).
92. 672 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1982).
93. Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1982).
94. Id. at 796.
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states. This, however, was not always the case. Earlier decisions
often strictly interpret the test 'for navigability. Had these earlier
cases been instituted today, a different result - a finding of
navigability - would have been more likely. For example, in
Toledo Liberal Shooting Co. v. Erie Shooting Club, 95 waterfowl on a lake
were pursued by hunters in small boats, but the court stated this
was uncommon and "proved nothing." ' 96 Today, however, such
use might well help prove navigability. The modern judicial
interpretation of the federal navigability test is also represented by
a 1981 federal decision that found the White River in Washington
State navigable, and in doing so recognized, but ignored, a 1913
Washington Supreme Court decision finding the river
nonnavigable.9 7 This Article will next turn to a review of the
manner in which the North Dakota Supreme Court has addressed
the issue of title navigability.
C.

NORTH DAKOTA AND THE.NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE TEST

The North Dakota Supreme Court has considered navigability
for purposes of determining title. In only four cases did the court to
any extent discuss what characteristics make a body of water
navigable and subject to state ownership.
The first decision is Bissel v. Olson,98 a 1913 case concerning the
Mouse River. Olson owned land on each side of the river and he
built a suspension footbridge to connect his land. 99 This bridge
disrupted Bissel's business of operating passenger boats on the
river.100 The court was unsure what test to apply for determining
whether the bed was owned privately or by the state. It began by
setting forth the federal test,' 0' but later stated:
The authorities are not altogether agreed as to the exact
extent to which a stream must be navigable to make it
navigable in fact and law. Some hold that the fact that it
may be capable of use for hunting and pleasure boating is
95.90 F. 680 (6th Cir. 1898).
96. Toledo Liberal Shooting Co. v. Erie Shooting Club, 90 F. 680, 682 (6th Cir. 1898). For
other decisions that might have been decided differently today, see United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S.
1, 14-24 (1935); Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1906); State v. Bollenbach, 63 N.W.2d
278, 288-89 (Minn. 1954).
97. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 644 F.2d 785,
787-88 (9th Cir. 1981); see Sumner Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Pacific Coast Power Co., 72 Wash.
631, __, 131 P. 220, 224 (1913) (determining that the White River was not navigable).
98. 26 N.D. 60, 143 N.W. 340 (1913).
99. Bissel v. Olson, 26 N.D. 60, 63, 143 N.W. 340, 341 (1913).
100. Id. at 63, 143 N.W. at 341.
101. Id. at63, 143 N.W. at 341.
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insufficient, while others hold that any substantial
02
capacity for use in those respects renders it navigable. 1
The court's uncertainty is not surprising. There was a long
period during which many jurisdictions were unsure whether the
federal test governed title or whether a state could apply a local
test. 10 3 The uncertainty was due to the lack of a United States
Supreme Court decision directly addressing the issue. Not until the
Court's decisions in 1922 and 1926 of United States v. Holt State
Bank'0 4 and Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States'0 5 was it clear
that the federal test controlled. Each case was brought by the
United States asserting, for the benefit of an Indian tribe, title to
the bed of a waterway. 0 6 The states involved in the cases,
Minnesota and Oklahoma, broadly defined navigability, thereby
giving them ownership of more land than they would have had
under a stricter test. 0 7 In ruling that the question of navigability is
to be decided under the federal test, the Holt State Bank Court
stated:
Navigability, when asserted as the basis of a right arising
under the Constitution of the United States, is necessarily
a question of federal law to be determined according to
the general rule .... To treat the question as turning on the
varying local rules would give the Constitution a
diversified operation where uniformity was intended. 108
Prior to Holt State Bank and Brewer-Elliott some state courts
applied a local test. 0 9 Some federal courts also thought local tests
were applicable.11 Thus, it is understandable that the North
Dakota Supreme Court in Bissel struggled with, rather than
authoritatively addressed the navigability issue.
102. Id. at 73-74, 143 N.W. at 344.
103. Davis, supra note -20, at 668; Hallan, Rights in Soil and Minerals Under Water, 2 MINN. L.
REV. 34, 38 (1917);Johnson & Austin, supra note 24, at 7-9, 25-29.
104. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
105. 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
106. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co.
v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1922).
107. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55-56; Brewer- Elliott, 260 U.S. at 87-88.
108. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 55-56. The Nevada Supreme Court, explaining the rationale
for applying a federal test for navigability, stated: "[S]o that all states when admitted to the Union
have equal standing a uniform federal test to title of watercourse beds must be maintained." State v.
Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623,
-, 503 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1972).
109. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561,
-, 95 P. 499, 507 (1908); Lamprey v. Metcalf,
52 Minn. 181, 193, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893); Flisrand v. Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 465, 152 N.W.

796,800(1915).
110. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 31 (1893);Jackson-Walker Coal & MaterialCo. v. Hodges,

283 F. 457, 462-63 (D. Kan. 1918).
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It was not long, however, before the North Dakota Supreme
Court lost its way. In 1921, the court in Roberts v. Taylor'1 1 fell into
the error of other courts and applied a local test for determining
navigability. In Roberts each litigant owned land adjacent to
Sweetwater Lake. 112 After water receded from a part of the lake
bed, each claimed ownership of the newly dried land." 3s Because of
their theories, the question of title navigability arose." 4 The court
stated that deciding between state and private ownership "is for the
determination by this state in accordance with its policy and
law." 1 1 5 The court then noted that navigability was not confined to
waters capable of commerce, and could "exist when the waters may
be used for the convenience and enjoyment of the public, whether
traveling upon trade purposes or pleasure purposes. " 116
The test applied by the North Dakota Supreme Court in
Roberts to determine navigability is commonly referred to as "the
pleasure boat test." It is less strict than the federal test. Under the
federal test, recreational canoe use is but some proof of navigability
and must be supplemented with more convincing evidence that the
river is capable of commercial use. Under the pleasure boat test,
the usefulness of a river for a canoe conclusively establishes
navigability. It is obvious that disparate determinations of
navigability will result depending upon which test is applied. For
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
was called upon to decide whether a lake was navigable based on its
use by duck hunters in small boats.11 7 The court stated such use was
uncommon and "proves nothing." 11 8 Had the pleasure boat test
been applicable, however, such use would be significant and
perhaps sufficient to prove navigability. Pursuant to this test any
waters capable of being used by the public for its enjoyment are
navigable and the beds pass to the state. It is not, however, the
proper test. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted
the pleasure boat test in Roberts, the test has no application to title
questions. If it did, the state would own the beds of most of its
waterways. The court, however, cannot be harshly criticized.
111.47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
112. Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 148, 181 N.W. 622,623 (1921).
113. Id. at 150, 181 N.W. at 624.
114. Id. at 150, 181 N.W. at 624.
115. Id. at 152, t81 N.W. at625.
116. Id. at 154, 181 N.W. at 626. The court cited Lamprey v. Metcalf which also adopted a
pleasure boat test for navigability and title purposes. See id. at 152, 181 N.W. at 625; Lamprey v.
Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 199-200,53 N.W. 1139, 1143-44(1893).
117. Toledo Liberal Shooting Co. v. Erie Shooting Club, 90 F. 680(6thCir. 1898).
118. Id. at 682.
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Numerous other courts made the same mistake and applied local
tests. 119
After the 1922 and 1926 United States Supreme Court
decisions clarifying the issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court
should have remedied its error. 120 Its chance to do so came in 1949.
In State v. Brace12 1 the court considered the navigability, that is, the
ownership of the bed of Fuller's Lake. 122 The lake is in Steele
County on the south branch of the Goose River and the state
sought to establish a wildlife refuge in and around the lake. 123 The
State brought an eminent domain action to acquire the littoral
land. 124 The landowner claimed the lake was nonnavigable, his title
extended to the lake bed, and, therefore, the state also was required
to compensate him for taking the bed. 125 The State argued it
already owned the bed because the lake was navigable.' 26 In
support of its claim, the State relied on the liberal pleasure boat test
of Roberts. 127 The court did not say this was the wrong criterion as it
should have in light of Holt and Brewer-Elliott.128 Rather, it
implicitly acknowledged the correctness of the pleasure boat test by
pointing out the factual differences between Fuller's Lake and the
lake at issue in Roberts. 129 The court should have simply rejected
Roberts rather than distinguish its facts.
Another 1949 case also dealt with navigability for title. OzarkMahoning Co. v. State130 was a North Dakota quiet title action
brought by a littoral landowner of Grenora Lake Number Two.131
The action was brought because the State claimed ownership of the
bed. 132 The justices began on the right track. The court stated
navigability "is a federal question to be determined according to
the law and usage recognized in the federal courts,''133 and title is
119. See supra note 109.
120. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
121. 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949).
122. State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314,318, 36 N.W.2d 330, 333 (1949);
123. Seeid. at 315, 319, 36 N.W.2d at 331, 333.
124. Id. at 315, 36 N.W.2d at 331.
125. Id. at 316, 36 N.W.2d at 331-32.
126. Id. at 317, 36 N.W.2d at 332.
127. Id. at 317, 36 N.W.2d at 334; see Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
128. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
129. State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 321, 36 N.W.2d 330, 334 (1949). The court did, however,
find the lake nonnavigable because of its small size and the amount of vegetation in it. Id. at 312, 36
N.W.2d at 334.
130. 76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488 (1949).
131. Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 466, 37 N.W.2d 488, 489 (1949).
132. Id. at 467, 37 N.W..2d at 490.
133. Id. at 468, 37 N.W.2d at 490.
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"measured by the federal rule as to navigability.... ,,t34 But then
the court, citing Roberts135 and Brace136, came back to the state rule:
And while the test as to navigability applied in North
Dakota is not as narrow as that in the federal courts,
nevertheless, considering the record in the light of the
tests determining navigability heretofore adopted and
applied by our own court, we can come to no other
conclusion than that the lake is not now.. .navigable.... 137
From these four decisions it is unclear what analysis the North
Dakota Supreme Court would apply in determining navigability
for title. 138 In its next opportunity to address the subject of
navigability the court should recognize the controlling effect of the
federal title test and reject the pleasure boat test. It would be helpful
if the court were also to take such an opportunity to explain
whether the pleasure boat test has a role in North Dakota water
law. And it may well have a place. Although the decisions are not
useful precedents for title questions, their broad definition of
navigability and recognition of public interests in water for
recreation may be important foundations upon which to build a
theory of public recreational rights in water over private property.
Such a theory is discussed in section III of this Article.

D.

NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS IN NORTH DAKOTA

A number of judicial decisions comment upon the navigability
of North Dakota waterways. Some of the decisions fully discuss
navigability, others only' comment in passing on the issue. Without
a statement of the evidence, a decision is not persuasive because
one is left without the opportunity of evaluating whether the criteria
of the federal navigability test have been satisfied or even if the
court followed the correct test. 13 9 Because of the disparity with
which the decisions discuss navigability, they must be carefully
read to adequately assess their precedential value. In addition,
some are questionable authority because an incorrect test of
134. Id. at 468, 37 N.W.2d at 491.
135. Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921).
136. State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949).
137. Ozark-Mahoning Co., 76 N.D. at 469, 37 N.W.2d at 491.
138. The court's uncertainty regarding the test for navigability has led a commentator on North
Dakota water law to err. See Beck, supra note 20, at 441-44 (discussing title navigability pursuant to
North Dakota law).
139. SeeOklahomav. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591 (1922).
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navigability is applied. Some involve private litigants and thus are
not binding on the state. Even so, if a navigability decision involved
just private parties, it might still be used by another court in
making a decision on state ownership.14 0 The evidentiary record of
past cases might also be used. 141 A list of the decisions commenting
upon navigability follows:
1. Cannonball River - The Cannonball River was
assumed nonnavigable in a tort action seeking
damages for negligent diversion and damming of the
river in Ferdererv. Northern Pacific Railway. 142
2. Devils Lake (West Bay) - West Bay in Devils Lake
was found navigable in a title dispute between a
littoral landowner and the state and federal
government in 101 Ranch v. United States. 143
3. Devils Lake - Devils Lake was assumed navigable in
In re Ownership of the Bed of Devils Lake. 144
4. Devils Lake - In Rutten v. State, 145 an action seeking
an injunction to prohibit the state from raising the
lake level, Devils Lake was stipulated as navigable. 146
5. Fuller's Lake (south branch of the Goose River) The court determined in an eminent domain action
that Fuller's Lake was nonnavigable in State v.
Brace. 147
140. See Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Curnn', 644 F.2d 785,
788 (9th Cir. 1981).
141. See id.; Loving v. Alexander, 548 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (W.D. Va. 1982).
142. 77 N.D. 169, 180, 42 N.W.2d 216, 222 (1950).
143. 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Dec. 19, 1981) (order granting
motion for partial summary judgment). In Ranch the order was based on a motion for partial
summary judgment made by the State of North Dakota, a defendant in the case. Id. In its supporting
brief North Dakota set forth evidence of navigability. Memorandum in support of Motion for Partial
SummaryJudgment at 5-9, 101 Ranch v. United States No. A2-81-89 (D.N.D. Oct. 15, 1981). In
response, the Plaintiffagreed that the West Bay of Devils Lake was navigable at statehood. Plaintiff's
Response to Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment at 1, 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89
(D.N.D. Dec. 8, 1981). The court, in its order on the motion, did not discuss evidence of
navigability but simply declared West Bay navigable. 101 Ranch v. United States, No. A2-81-89 at I
(D.N.D. Dec. 19, 1981) (order granting motion for partial summary judgment).
144. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Determination Not to Delay Entry ofJudgment,
and Order forJudgment, No. 12121 at 1 (Ramsey County Dist, Ct. March 3, 1987), aff'd,
N.W.2d

-

(N.D. 1988).

145. 93 N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1958). Though the parties in Rutten stipulated to navigability, the
decision gives some of the evidence of navigability. Id. at 797-99.
146. Rutten v. State, 93 N.W.2d 796, 797 (N.D. 1958).
147. 76 N.D. 314, 36 N.W.2d 330 (1949). The court in Brace applied the wrong test of
navigability, the pleasure boat test. See State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 318-19, 36 N.W.2d 330, 335
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6. Grenora Lake No. 2 - This body of water was
determined to be nonnavigable in a title dispute
between the State and a littoral landowner in Ozark-

Mahoning Co. v. State. 148
7. Heart River - In a condemnation action, the Heart
River was assumed nonnavigable in Bigelow v.

Draper.149
8.James River - The James River was implicitly
assumed to be navigable in a mortgage foreclosure
150
action in Heald v. Yumisko.
9. Knife River - This river was assumed nonnavigable
in a title dispute between a riparian landowner and

the State in State v. Loy.

151

10. Little Missouri River - This river, in a title dispute
between the State and federal government, was
determined to be navigable in North Dakota ex rel. Board
152
of University & School Lands v. Andrus.

11. Missouri River -

In Hogue v. Bourgois, 153 a title
dispute between the state and riparian owner, this
154
river was stipulated as navigable.

12. Missouri River - This river has also been stipulated
as navigable in a title dispute between the State and
155
riparian landowners.
(1949). Nevertheless, if the lake is nonnavigable under this test, it would be nonnavigable under the
proper federal test. For a discussion of the federal test, see supra notes 21-97 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the pleasure boat test, see supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
148. 76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488 (1949). The court in Ozark-Mahoning seemed to apply the
incorrect pleasure boat test of navigability. See Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 468, 37
N.W.2d 488, 491 (1949). If the lake was nonnavigable under this test, however, the lake would be
nonnavigable under the federal test. For a discussion of the federal test, see supra notes 21-97 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the pleasure boat test, see supra notes 111-16 and
-accompanying text.
149.6 N.D. 152, 156, 69 N.W. 570, 570 (1896).
150. 7 N.D. 422, 426, 75 N.W. 806, 808 (1898).
151. 74 N.D. 182, 184, 20 N.W.2d 668, 669 (1945).
152. 671 F.2d 271, 278 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'don other grounds sub non., Block v. North Dakota ex
ret. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
153. 71 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1955). In Hogue v. Bourgois the court stated that its decision of
navigability was based on testimony, but the court did not include the testimony in the opinion.
Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955). Yet, there is no doubt the Missouri River is
navigable.
154. Id.

155. State v. T.nv. 74 N.D. 182, 185, 20 N.W.2d 668, 669 (1945).
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13. Painted Woods Lake - In a title dispute between the
State and the littoral landowner, this lake was
determined to be navigable in North Dakota v. Hoge.156
14. Rush Lake - In a-title dispute between littoral
landowners, Rush Lake was assumed nonnavigable in

Brignall v. Hannah.157
15. Souris (Mouse) River In an eminent domain
action, this river was assumed to be nonnavigable in
Amoco Oil Co. v. State Highway Department.158
16. Souris (Mouse) River - This river was also found to
be nonnavigable in Bissel v. Olson. 159
17. Sweetwater Lake - This lake was determined to be
navigable in a title dispute between littoral
landowners in Roberts v. Taylor. 160
156. A1-83-42, slip op. at 6 (S.W.D. N.D. Feb. 28, 1984).
157.34 N.D. 174, 179, 157 N.W. 1042, 1043 (1916).
158. 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978); see also State ex rel. Trimble v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.
S. M. Ry., 28 N.D. 621, 623, 150 N.W. 463, 464 (1915) (assumed nonnavigable); Freeman v.
Trimble, 21 N.D. 1, 7, 129 N.W.83, 86 (1910) (stipulated as nonnavigable).
159. 26 N.D. 60, 75-76, 143 N.W. 340, 345 (1913). Bissel dealt with a riparian's right to
interfere with public use of a river. Bissel v. Olson, 26 N.D. 60, 62-63, 143 N.W. 340, 341 (1913).
Though the court stated that the Mouse (Souris) River is nonnavigable, if studied, for several
reasons it becomes apparent that Bissel is not the final word on the Souris' navigability or state
ownership of its bed. The defendant Olson built a footbridge across the river. Id. at 63, 143 N.W. at
341. This interfered with Bissel's business of transporting passengers on the river. Id. at 63, 143
N.W. at 341. Bissel obtained, on the basis of affidavits, an injunction prior to trial that ordered
removal of the bridge. Id. at 62, 143 N.W. at 341, 345. It was this preliminary order that the
supreme court considered. Id. at 76, 143 N.W. at 346. The court stated: "It should be a strong case
which warrants the trial court in granting a mandatory injunctional order for the destruction of
property, pending the trial of an action upon its merits." Id. at 76, 143 N.W. at 346. Though Bissel's
affidavits contained significant proof of navigability, the court was particularly concerned about
allowing destruction of the bridge without first fully airing the issue of navigability at trial. Id. at 76,
143 N.W. at 346. The court also noted that Bissel overlooked some points of the law of navigability,
but added "these may be supplied on a trial on the merits." Id. at 77, 143 N.W. at 346. This implies
the possibility of a different result. Another important point is that Olson built his bridge over a part
of the Souris River which had risen as a result of the construction of two dams on the river
downstream from the bridge. Id. at 63, 143 N.W. at 341. The court, however, emphasized a river
must be navigable in its natural condition and not by artificial means. Id. at 67, 143 N.W. at 341-42.
This may have been one of the points of navigability law overlooked by Bissel and led to a failure to
present evidence of navigability without the effect of the railroad dams. Without such evidence the
court had no opportunity to find the river navigable in its natural condition in the area of the bridge.
Olson was also prosecuted criminally for building the bridge. State v. Olson, 26 N.D. 402, 402, 144
N.W. 1135, 1135 (1913) (per curiam). His conviction was reversed by stipulation. Id. The
stipulation was a result of Bissel's declaration that the Mouse was nonnavigable. Id. In Olson the
Supreme Court of North Dakota stated "Bissel v. Olson... held that the Mouse [Souris] River was
not at that point navigable, or at least the plaintiff failed in his proof." Id. Thus, the court confined
Bissel's finding of nonnavigability to just the area of the dispute, not the entire river. It also implied
that had Bissel better understood the law, a finding of navigability was possible. In addition, Bissel is
not resjudicata against North Dakota because the State was not a party.
160. 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W.2d 622 (1921). In finding the lake navigable, the court applied the
wrong test. See Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 154, 181 N.W.2d 622, 626 (1921). While the
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It is also possible for a court to take judicial notice of a
waterway's navigability. 161 Facts that may be judicially noticed are
"either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
' 162
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot readily be questioned.
The Red River of North Dakota has never been declared navigable
but could surely be noticed as such by a court because of its
substantial use by steamships to transport passengers and cargo
during North Dakota's early years.
An administrative agency's view of the navigability or
nonnavigability of a waterway may be considered by a court in
making its decision. 163 The worth of such views, however, will
depend upon the factual basis of the agency decision. The United
States Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for implementing
the River and Harbor Act of 1894. Section 403 of the Act prohibits
unauthorized obstruction or alteration of "navigable waters of the
United States."164 The Corps has prepared a list of North Dakota
waterways it considers navigable for purposes of the Act. 161
The definition of "navigable waters of the United States" and
navigability for purposes of determining title are similar.
"Navigable waters of the United States" are those waters that "are
presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible
to use to transport interstate or foreign commerce."1 66 Waters are
navigable under the federal title test "when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." 167 Thus, use
of the Corps' determination and the evidence upon which it is
based may be useful in proving state ownership of a body of water
in North Dakota.
Absence from the Corps' list, however, does not necessarily
mean the Corps considers a waterway nonnavigable.1 68 Presently,
decision is res judicata between the parties, other interests may yet seek a declaration that the lake is
nonnavigable under the federal test.
161. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899); Harrison v.
Fite, 148 F. 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1906).
162. N.D. R. Evuo. 201.
163. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 23 (1935); Alaska v. United States, 754 F.2d 851,
855 (9th Cir. 1985).
164. River & Harbor Act of 1894, 33 U.S.C. S 403 (1982).
165. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Oraha Dist., Special Public Notice, North Dakota: All
Waterways, Lakes and Wetlands 1 (Nov. 13, 1986).
166.33 C.F.R. § 322.2(a) (1987); see also 33 C.F.R. § 329.1-. 16 (1987) (definition of navigable
waters of the United States).
167. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
168. 33 C.F.R. § 329.16(b) (1987).
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the Corps believes the following North Dakota waterways are
deemed "navigable waters of the United States:" 169 the Missouri
River; the Yellowstone River; the Red River from Wahpeton to the
Canadian border; the Bois de Sioux River from the North DakotaSouth Dakota border to Wahpeton; the James River from the
North Dakota-South Dakota border to Jamestown; and the Upper
Des Lacs Lake. 170
E.

CONSEQUENCES

OF

TITLE NAVIGABILITY

FOR

THE. NORTH

DAKOTA RECREATIONIST

1. Navigable waterways are public highways
The present liberal judicial interpretation of the federal
navigability test is significant for North Dakota. The State has
asserted ownership to only a few waterways. Generally, the State
has acquiesced in the claims of private ownership. 171 Were this
policy rethought - and it should at least be debated by state
officials and legislators - and an assertion of ownership made, the
State could find itself declared the owner of the beds of more than a
few rivers. Reasonable claims might be made that rivers such as the
Cannonball, Heart, James, Sheyenne, Souris, and Yellowstone are
navigable, and their beds in state ownership. Characteristics of
these rivers in 1889 may make them susceptible to trade or travel
by simple watercraft and, therefore, navigable. Because minerals
may lie below some of these rivers as well as others, ownership
could increase state revenue. Ownership might also facilitate water
development and marketing projects, primarily by avoiding taking
169. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Omaha Dist., Special Public Notice, North Dakota: All
Waterways, Lakes and Wetlands 1 (Nov. 13, 1986).
170. Id.
171. A state's failure to actively assert its title to the soil of a navigable waterway does not inhibit
the public's right to use the water. In general, the people do not lose a public resource like navigable
waters and the underlying soil because officials have for a long period failed to seek a judicial
declaration of navigability or have otherwise failed to protect public interests in the resource. State v.
Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 240,
-_, 625 P.2d 256, 258-60, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 715-17 (1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 865, State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, -,
503 P.2d 1231, 1238 (1972); State v.
George C. Stafford & Sons, Inc., 99 N.H. 92,
-_, 105 A.2d 569, 573 (1954); State v. Hutchins, 79
N.H. 132, -,
105 A. 519, 522-23 (1919). In City of Long Beach v. Mansel, the court did, however,
use a balancing of the equities test to decide whether to maintain public title to reclaimed tidal lands.
City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, -,
476 P.2d 423, 441-51, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 41-51
(1970). Furthermore, a riparian's reliance on judicial decisions may also affect a state's ability to
enforce public rights in navigable waters and lands under them. See City of Berkeley v. Superior
Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, , 606 P.2d 362, 373-74, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 338-39 (1980) (court
balanced the interests of the riparian owners and the state and determined that land which had been
improved or was no longer suitable for public use was free from the public trust), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 840 (1980).
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issues. 7 2 The advantages to the state of state ownership, however,
are not the concern of this Article. The objective of the Article is to
analyze what state ownership of submerged land means for the
recreationist.
Ownership by the state of navigable waterways is significant
for the recreationist. If a river or lake is navigable the public has a
right to use the water for recreation. 173 The United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly stated navigable waters are subject to public
navigation and use.' 74 For example, in Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois,175 the Supreme Court stated that the people have the right
to "enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over
them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction
76
or interference of private parties."
State courts agree with the Supreme Court's understanding of
the importance of navigable waters for the public. The Iowa
Supreme Court considered a case in which a riparian on a
navigable river sought an injunction curtailing the public's use of
.motorboats on the river in McCauley v. Salmon.1 77 The riparian
claimed the boats were unreasonably noisy and their high speed
created waves that eroded his land. 178 In affirming the trial court's
decision to enjoin unreasonable noise but not the speed of the
boats, the court stated navigable waters are like a "public
highway" and the right of the public to navigate them "is
paramount.''179 The court added that this public privilege
"includes the right of fishing, boating, skating and other
sports.' '180

Many courts have declared navigable waters such a valuable
resource that the state holds them in trust for the benefit of the
people. 18 ' The public uses that may be made of this trust resource
172. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (prohibiting the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation). For a discussion of the rights of a state versus a riparian's rights, see
Comment, The StateNavigation Servitude, 4 LAND & WATER L. REv. 521 (1969).
173. Johnson & Austin, supra note 24, at 34. "There appears to be almost complete uniformity
regarding the rights of public use on waters where the state owns the bed. In all the slates surveyed,
except Colorado, the courts have held that the public has the right to use these waters for fishing,
commercial travel, recreation and otherwise." Id.
174. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 452 (1892); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874); Railroad Co. v. Shurmeir, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 272, 287 (1868); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
175. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
176. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
177. McCauley v. Salmon, 234 Iowa 1020, 1022, 14 N.W.2d 715, 716 (1944).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623,
-_, 503 P.2d 1231, 1237 (1972) ("lilt has been held, in
what appears to be a majority of cases, that the states hold title to the beds of navigable watercourses
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are broad. Representative of decisions broadly defining the public
uses is Nelson v. De Long. 182 In upholding the validity of a city
ordinance that in several ways enhanced the usefulness of a lake for
the public but limited its usefulness for a littoral landowner, the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "Public use comprehends not
only navigation by watercraft for commercial purposes, but the use
also for the ordinary purposes of life such as- boating, fowling,
skating, bathing, taking water for domestic or agricultural
purposes, and cutting ice." 183
Along with judicial authority allowing public use of navigable
waterways, section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code, in
relevant part, provides: "All navigable rivers shall remain and be
deemed public highways." ' 184 The statute does not define
"navigable rivers" nor have North Dakota courts interpreted it.
There is, however, no reason to believe "navigable rivers" does
not include rivers navigable under the federal title test.1 8 5 Thus,
public recreational rights in navigable waters is based on statutory
as well as common law.
2. The geographic boundaries of the public's right to use navigable
waterways and the effect of section 47-01-15 of the North
Dakota Century Code
North Dakota's ownership of the beds of navigable waterways
extends to the ordinary high-water mark.1 86 The term "ordinary
high-water mark" has been defined as "the part of the bank or
shore up to which the presence and action of the water is so
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction
recognized
or other easily
of terrestrial vegetation,
in trust for the people of their respective states."). E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
452 (1892); McCauley, 234 Iowa at 1022, 14 N.W.2d at 716; Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821,
822 (S.D. 1937); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 189, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893); North
Dakota State Water Comm'n v. Board of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254, 258 (N.D. 1983); State v.
Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d91,__, 408 N.W.2d 337, 341 (1987).

182. 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942).
183. Nelson v. Delong, 213 Minn. 425, 429, 7 N.W.2d 342, 346 (1942); see also Witke v. State
Conservation Comm'n, 244 Iowa 261, 265, 56 N.W.2d 582, 588 (1953) (state is trustee of navigable
waters for the benefit of the public); Hillebrand, 274 N.W. at 822-23 (the state holds title "in trust for
the people that they may enjoy the use of navigable waters for fishing, boating, and other public
purposes...."); Doemel v.Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 229, 193 N.W. 393, 397 (1923).
184. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978).
185. A South Dakota statute similar to § 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code has been
interpreted to apply to rivers navigable for purposes of title. Flisrand v. Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 152
N.W. 796, 799-801 (1915). Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978) (all navigable rivers shall
remain and be deemed public highways) with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-17-2 (Supp. 1987) (all
navigable rivers and lakes are public highways).
186. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1893); Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 783 (8th Cir.
1906); Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 425, 84 N.W. 855, 856 (1901).
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characteristic." 18 7 The ordinar 7 high-water mark is not the line
reached by floods, nor is the low-water mark the line reached
during droughts. 188
If the state's title to navigable waterways extends to the highwater mark, seemingly the public may use the entire area between
the high-water marks for general recreation. However, a sentence
of section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
"except when the grant under which the land is held indicates a
different intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on a
navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at
low watermark. ' 189 The statute seeks to give an interest to
riparians in the space between the low and high water mark, an
area known as the shorezone.
The validity of section 47-01-15's grant is reviewed in the
following section, for now we need only ask whether the statute
restricts to the low-water mark the public's recreational right in
navigable rivers and lakes. North Dakota's neighboring states have
addressed this question. These states find that under a grant like
that given by section 47-01-15, the riparian's interest is limited and
does not inhibit public use of the shorezone. 190
By judicial decision, riparians on navigable rivers in
Minnesota own to the low-water mark. 191 This title, however, is not
absolute except to the high-water mark. In State v. Korrer,192 a case

involving a riparian's right to mine the bed of a river, the court
noted the following about the riparian's title to the area between
high and low water mark:
408 N.W.2d 337, 342 (1987) (quoting Diana
187. State v. Trudeau, 139 Wisc. 2d 91, -,
145 N.W. 816 (1914)); see also Oklahoma v. Texas,
Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, -,
260 U.S. 606, 632 (1923) (high water mark is indicated by area that is practically bare of vegetation);
Carpenter v. Board of Comm'rs 56 Minn. 513, 522, 58 N.W. 295, 297 (1894) (high water mark is
that mark made by a water level sufficiently continuous to divest an area of vegetation); Maloney,
The Ordinary High Water-Mark: Attempts at Settling an UnsettledBoundary Line, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV.
465, 467 (1978) (high water line can be found by examining the water banks and ascertaining the
presence of water in respect to vegetation). In North Dakota, the statutory definition of the ordinary
high-water mark for the purposes of the regulation of water conservation is "that line reached by
water when lake or stream is ordinarily full and the water ordinarily high." N.D. CENT. CODE S 6115-01(2) (1985). Proof of a high-water mark may be made by the testimony of laymen long familiar
with the waterway, as well as by such experts as geologists, botanists, and engineers. See Payette
189 P.2d 1009, 1019 (1948)
Lake Protection Ass'n v. Lake Reservoir Co., 69 Idaho 111, __,
(testimony of engineers used to determine high-water mark); City of Cedar Rapids v. Marshall, 199
Iowa 1262, 1266, 203 N.W. 932, 933-34 (1925) (testimony of botanists used to determine high-water
mark).
188. Alabama v. Georgia, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 505, 515 (1859); Flisrand v. Madson, 35 S.D.
457, __, 152 N.W. 796, 800-01 (1915).
189. N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-01-15 (1978).
190. See id.
191. State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 71, 148 N.W. 617, 623 (1914).
192. 172 Minn. 60, 148 N.W. 617 (1914).
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[The riparian's] title is limited or qualified by the right of
the public to use the same for purpose of navigation or
other public purpose. The state may use it for any such
public purpose, and to that end may reclaim it during
periods of low water, and protect it from any use, even by
the riparian owner, that would interfere with its present
or prospective public use, without compensation. 193
1 94
The South Dakota Supreme Court in Anderson v. Ray
considered, in light of a statute like section 47-01-15, the power of
government to raise the waters of a lake to maintain the lake's
usefulness as a public recreational resource.' 95 The littoral
19 6
landowner had used the shorezone for pasture and hayland.
Raising the water level would destroy this use.' 97 Nonetheless, the
court stated the landowner's title to the shorezone was "subject to
the superior right of the public ....
"198 The North Dakota Attorney
General's Office believes this decision is correct1 99 and "of prime
importance because the State of South Dakota was admitted to the
Union in 1889, under the same Enabling Act and provisions, and
at the same time as the State of North Dakota.' '200
In Montana, riparian owners on navigable waters "take" to
the low-water mark just as they do in North Dakota. 20 ' Even so, in
Gibson v. Kelly20 2 the Montana Supreme Court determined that the
public still has "certain rights of navigation and fishery upon the
20 3
river and upon the strip in question."
Recently, in a quiet title action, the California Supreme Court
addressed the issue of public rights in the area between high and
low water. 20 4 The California statute in question, section 830 of the
193. State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. at 71, 148 N.W. at 623; see also Pike Rapids Power Co. v.
Minneapolis St.P. & S.S.M.R. Co., 99 F.2d 902, 912 (8th Cir. 1938) ("[tlhe riparian right to build
the dam at no time ceased to exist, but such right was at all times servient to the supreme power of
the federal government to regulate its exercise insofar as such regulation is appropriate to the
interests of navigation."); Carpenter v. Board of Comm'rs 56 Minn. 513, -,
58 N.W. 295, 296
(1894).
194.37 S.D. 17, 156 N.W. 591 (1916).
195. Anderson v. Ray, 37 S.D. 17, 20, 156 N.W. 591, 592(1916).
196. Id. at 20-21, 156 N.W. at 592.
197. See id. at 20-21, 156 N.W. at 592.
198. Id. at 24, 156 N.W. at 594-95. Flisrand v. Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 470, 152 N.W. 796, 801
(1915).
199. N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 5 (Jan. 26, 1966), reprinted in Report of the Attorney General of
North Dakota 473, 476-77 (1964-66).
200. N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 1, 3 (Oct. 7, 1965), reprinted in Report of the Attorney General of
North Dakota 459, 461 (1964-66).
201. See Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 422, 39 P. 517, 519 (1895).
202. 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895).
203. Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417,423, 39 P. 517, 519 (1895).
204. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 214, 625 P.2d 239, 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 698
(1981).
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Civil Code, is much like section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota
Century Code.2 °5 The plaintiffs, the Lyons, owned land adjacent to
a navigable lake. 20 6 They sought to develop marshland on the lake,
most of which was covered by water at certain times of the year.20 7
They applied to the Fish and Game Commission for a permit to
repair a levee for the purpose of reclaiming a part of the marsh. 20 8
The Commission determined it could not process the application
because the State claimed ownership of that part of the marsh below
the high-water mark.2 0 9 Though recognizing its decision would
effect 4,000 miles of shore along California rivers and lakes, the
court stated section 830 is not an absolute grant of the shorezone to
2 10
the riparian, for this area remains subject to public use.
The Lyons sought to confine public use to the water, arguing
that the public should be able to use the area between high and low
water only when the area was covered by water. 211 The court
rejected the Lyons' contention, stating: "[T]he public's interest is
not confined to the water, but extends also to the bed of the
water.' '212
Besides Minnesota, South Dakota, Montana, and California,
other states qualify the riparian title in the shorezone. 21 3 The
typical rationale for limiting the riparian's interest in the sho'ezone
is the public trust doctrine.2 1 4 It is unnecessary to do more than
summarize the doctrine because many commentators and courts
have explained it.215
205. Compare N.D. GENT. CODE S 47-01-15 (1978) (upland owner takes to low watermark) with
CAL. CIV. CODE S 830 (West 1982) (same). Section 830 of the California Civil Code provides, in
relevant part: "Except where the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the
owner of the upland.. when it borders upon navigable lake or stream.., takes at low-water mark...."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 830 (West 1982).
206. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d at 214-15,625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
207. Id. at 215, 625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 698.

208. Id. at 215,625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
209. Id. at 215, 625 P.2d at 241, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
210. Id. at 216, 226, 625 P.2d at 242, 248, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699, 705.

211. Id. at 229,625 P.2d at 250-51, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
212. Id. at 231, 625 P.2d at 250-51, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 708. In a companion case the California
court noted that the State may assert and enforce the public interest in the shorezone even though it
failed to do so for over 100 years. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 240, 24-47, 625 P.2d 251, 25860, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 715-18 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981). The court added, however,
that should the State seek removal of improvements in the shorezone, compensation must be paid to
the riparian. Id. at 249, 625 P.2d at 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19. For a discussion of these two
cases, see Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine After Lyon and Fogerty: Private Interests and Public
Expectations - A New Balance, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 631 (1983); Note, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented
Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1138 (1982).

213. See, e.g., Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 42, 211 N.W. 115, 117-18 (1926); Broward v.
Marby, 102 Miss. 517 __,
59 So. 826, 829-30 (1909); Stover v. Jack, 100 Am. Dec. 566, 568 (Pa.
1869); see also, e.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 57 F. 803, 813 (6th Cir. 1893) (applying Michigan law and
determining that riparian's title issubject to the public interest), aff'd, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
214. E.g., State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 226, 32, 625 P.2d 239, 248-52, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 696, 705-09 (1981); Collins, 237 Mich. at 4, 211 N.W. at 117-18; State v. Korrer, 127 Minn.
60, 70, 148 N.W. 617,621 (1914); Broward, 102 Miss. at.-,
59 So. at 829.

215. For an authoritative study of the public trust doctrine, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in

NaturalResource Law: EffectiveJudicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Some other studies of,
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The public trust doctrine is ancient, its roots stretching
through English common law to Rome.2 16 The basic principle
behind this doctrine is that "[t]here are things which belong to no
one, and the use of which is common to all." 2'1 7 These things are
particularly valuable natural resources capable of multiple uses and
which man cannot reproduce and that cannot regenerate
themselves. 2 18 Society places great stock in these resources and the
public trust doctrine protects them for the public benefit.
Originally, the trust applied only to water subject to the tide
and to soil under tidewaters. In America the trust was soon
extended to all navigable waters and their beds. 219 The North
Dakota Supreme Court was given the opportunity to consider the
public trust doctrine in United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota
State Water Conservation Commission. 220 In United Plainsmen an
environmental group sought to prevent the state engineer from
issuing a water permit for coal related energy production. 22' The
United Plainsmen argued that the public trust doctrine prevented
issuance of the permit until the State had prepared a comprehensive short and long term plan for conservation and development of
the State's natural resources. 222 The court adopted the doctrine in
this expanded form and held that "[t]he State holds the navigable
waters, as well as the lands beneath them, in trust for the
public.' '223
I V. YANNAGONE, B. COHEN & 'S. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 11-47 (1972 & Supp. 1987); Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law:
Discord or Harmony, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1984); Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to
Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning andJohnson, 63 DEN.
U. L. REV. 565 (1986); Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980); Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes the People's
EnvironmentalRight, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 195 (1980); Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water
Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (1982); Wilkinson, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980); Yannacone, Agricultural
Lands, FertileSoils, Popular Sovereignty, the Trust Doctrine, Environmental Impact Assessment and the Natural
Law, 51 N.D.L. REV. 615 (1975); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine in North Dakota, 54 N.D.L. REV. 565
(1978).
216. See United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 338 U.S. 725, 744 (1950) ("[als long ago as the
Institutes ofJustinian, running waters, like the air and sea, were res communes - things common to all
and property of none.").
217. V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, supra note 215, at 11 (quoting Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526 (1896)).
218. Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 34 Or. App. 853, __,
581 P.2d 520, 524 (1978),
aft'd, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979); V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, supra note 215, at
12; Wilkinson, supra note 215, at 315.
219. See Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 672 (1891) (finding that the public has rights in navigable
waters); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) (same).
220. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
221. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 458 (N.D. 1976).
222. Id. at 459.
223. Id. at 461.
the doctrine include:
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Initially, the trust protected only three public uses: navigation,
commerce, and fishing. 224 Today, however, it protects additional

public interests, such as general recreation and ecological
preservation. 225 Development of the doctrine was recognized in
United Plainsmen.226 In United Plainsmen the court stated, "it is
evident that the Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding
role in environmental law." 227 Indeed, the court's decision that the
public trust may require the State to develop a comprehensive plan
for its water resources before permitting a large appropriation 228 is
a unique application of the doctrine.
The public trust doctrine has also expanded the duties placed
upon state government. While today the doctrine requires
government to actively protect certain natural resources ,229traditionally the doctrine only limited a state's ability to alienate
public trust lands. The inalienability of trust resources was the issue
in the lodestar of public trust cases, Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois.230 In 1869, the Illinois Legislature granted the railroad
more than 1,000 acres of Chicago's harbor.231 A few years later, the
legislature had second thoughts about the wisdom of the grant and
revoked it.232 The subsequent lawsuit came to the United States
Supreme Court which u'pheld the revocation. 233 The Court stated:
[The grant was] not consistent with the exercise of that
trust which requires the government of the State to
preserve such water for the use of the public.... The State
can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
224. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971)
(public trust easements were traditionally limited to navigation, commerce, and fishing); State v.
Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 451, 472, 29 NW.2d 657, 669-70 (1947) (same).
225. E.g., District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1007, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(stating that the public trust doctrine has been expanded to protect additional water-related uses such
as swimming and similar recreation, aesthetic enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and preservation of
flora and fauna indigenous to public trust lands); State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 230, 625
P.2d 239, 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 708 (1981) (stating that public rights pursuant to public trust
doctrine include recreational uses and right to preserve nature); Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259-60, 491 P.2d
at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796 (same); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 34 Or. App. 853, 860,
581 P.2d 520, 524 (1978) (same); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 199, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143
(1893) (same); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 85 Wis. 2d
518, 526, 271 N.W.2d 69, 72 (1978) (same).
226. See UnitedPlainsmen, 247 N.W.2d at 463.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 463.
229. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 441, 658 P.2d 709, 724,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 360-61 (1983) (the public trust doctrine requires an affirmative duty on the part
of the state to protect the people's common heritage of waterways), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
230. 146-U.S. 387 (1892).
231. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 389 (1892).
232. Id.
233. Id.
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whole people are interested, like navigable waters and
soils under them... than it can abdicate its police powers
in the administration of government.... 214
Because of the public trust doctrine, a state's ownership of
land under navigable waters does not carry with it the ordinary
attributes of fee title. It is a title composed of two parts. 23 5 The first
is thejus privatum, the state's private property interest under which
it has the rights of fee owner. The second aspect of the title is jus
publicum. This refers to the state's public or sovereign interest in the
land under which it is bound to protect the public interest in the
trust resource. Referring to the state as "custodian" is helpful to
understand the nature of the sovereign title. 23 6 Though a state may
transfer its proprietary interest, 23 7 it cannot, except in unusual
circumstances, transfer its sovereign interest. 23 8 Thus, while a
riparian may, under a grant like section 47-01-15 of the North
Dakota Century Code, hold proprietary title to lands under
navigable waters, it is a qualified title because it remains impressed
with the public trust. 239 A state's grantee cannot obtain a better title
234. Id. at 253. The decision in Illinois Central is based on Illinois law, not federal common law
concerning public trusts. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926); see Illinois Central,
146 U.S. at 452. Other courts have followed Illinois Central and held that the trust protects public
interests in soil under navigable waters from government disposition or private encroachment. E.g.,
City of Oakland v. Oakland Water-Front Co., 118 Cal. 160, 168, 50 P. 277, 286 (1897); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438,
-,
161 P. 854, 860 (1916); State v. Longyear Holding Co., 224
Minn. 451, 472, 29 N.W.2d 657, 669-70 (1947); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 34 Or. App.
853, 860, 581 P.2d 520, 524 (1978); Priewe v. Wiiconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 93 Wis.
534, 542-43, 67 N.W. 918, 922 (1896), aff'don rehearing, 103 Wis. 537, 553, 79 N.W. 780, 781 (1899);
see also S. CIRIACY-WANTRUP, W. HUTCHINS, C. MARTZ, S. SATO & A. STONE, 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS:

A

TREATISE ON THE. LAW OF WATER AND

ALLIED PROBLEMS

196 (R.

Clark ed.

1967)

[hereinafter WATER RIGHTS] (no state has permitted the public interest in navigable waterways to be
alienated in fee to private persons).
The Illinois Central decision delineates exceptions to its rule that land under navigable waters
may not be granted to private persons. A transfer that promotes the public interest in trust lands is
acceptable as are transfers that do not substantially impair the public interest in trust lands. Illinois
Central, 146 U.S. at 453. Michigan allows similar exceptions to the nonalienability rule as those
provided for in Illinois Central. Obrecht v. National Gypsum Co., 361 Mich. 399, 413, 105 N.W.2d
143, 149 (1960). In California, the state in which the public trust doctrine is most fully developed, the
trust may be terminated by state action in at least four ways: if trust uses are improved; to settle
legitimate disputes over unclear boundaries; if the land is no longer needed for public trust purpose;
and, if an exchange of land is involved. Comment, supra note 212, at 634 n. 12. In California,
equitable estoppel may also extinguish the trust. Dunning, The Significance of California'sPublic Trust
Easementfbr Caliornia Water Rights Law 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357, 374-78 (1980). For a discussion
of the legitimacy of grants that promote the public interest, see id. at 369-74.
235. Scranton v. Wheeler, 57 F. 803, 813 (6th Cir. 1893), aff'd, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900);
Nedtweg v. Wallace, 237 Mich. 14, 17, 208 N.W. 51, 53-54 (1926); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State
Lands, 34 Or. App. 853, 859-60, 581 P.2d 520, 524 (1978), aff'd, 285 Or. 197, 590 P.2d 709 (1979);
U.S. __
-, 732 P.2d 989, 993-94 (1987), cert. denied, Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662,
(1987); Comment, supra note 212, at 633 n. 12.
236 State v. Cleveland & P.R. Co., 113 N.E. 677, 682 (Ohio 1916).
237. E.g., Nedtweg, 237 Mich. at 19-20, 208 N.W. at 54.
238. See supra note 234.
732 P.2d
239. E.g., Nedtweg, 237 Mich. at 20, 208 N.W. at 53; Caniniti, 107 Wash. 2d at __
at 994; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-01-15 (1978) (upland owner takes to low watermark).
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or a freer right than the state held. 240 Thus, a riparian holds
"naked legal title" 24 1 or "bare technical title." 242 As aptly pointed
out by one commentator, "[T]here is so little of proprietary24nature
3
left in the riparian that his is a strange 'ownership' indeed."
The riparian does, however, maintain certain rights. These
are the riparian rights to have access to and use of the water, to
accretions and relictions, to build docks, and to make use of the
shorezone in any way - as for pasture and hayland - that does
not measurably interfere with the public use. 24 4 As the California
Supreme Court noted: "[Riparians are] not deprived of the use of
the lands between low and high water, and [they] may utilize them
in any manner not incompatible with the public's interest in the

property.'

'245

While it is clear that the public may use navigable waters and
their beds for recreation, there may be a question whether the strip
between high and low water may be used when the water recedes.
Some courts say the public's rights depend upon the water level,
and when the water recedes the riparian has exclusive right to the
shorezone. 24 6 Since, however, the shorezone is impressed with the
public trust, and since a purpose of the trust is to protect public
recreation, doctrinal purity requires that the public be allowed use
of the shorezone whether it be covered with the navigable waters or
whether it be dry. It is illogical to distinguish between submerged
land and dry land in the shorezone since each are a part of the same
trust res. Similarly, the public should be allowed to use the dry land
for the same general purposes as it may use the water. 247 The
California Supreme Court does not distinguish between the
240. 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 197.

241. Scranton v. Wheeler, 57 F. 803, 813 (6th Cir. 1893), aff'd, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
242. Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900).
243. 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 198-99.

244. E.g., State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 71-72, 148 N.W. 617, 621-22 (1914). Flisrand v.
Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 470, 152 N.W. 796, 801 (1915).
245. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 232, 625 P.2d 239, 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 709
(1981).
142 N.E. 437, 441 (1923); Wilbour v.
246. E.g., Stewart v. Turney, 237 N.Y. 117, __,
462 P.2d 232, 238 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970)
Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, -,
Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225,..., 193 N.W. 393, 395 (1923). It is interesting to note that none of
these cases discussed the issue in relation to the public trust doctrine.
161 S.W.2d 957, 960-61 (1942) (public has
247. See Anderson v. Reames, 204 Ark. 216, -,
the right to make general recreational use of the area -between low and high water when it is not
471 A.2d 355, 363
submerged); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, -,
336
(1984) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Tucci v. Salzhauser, 40 A.D.2d 712, __,
N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (1972) (same), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 854, 307 N.E.2d 256, 352 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1973);
Durham v. Ingrassia, 105 Misc. 2d 191, 431 N.Y.S.2d 917, 922-23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (same);
Allen v. Allen, 19 R.I. 114, -, 32 A. 166, 166 (1895) (same); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414,
417, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (1937) (dictum) (same). Although some of these decisions deal with the
shorezone of tidal waters, the principles upon which they are decided are applicable to the shorezone
of inland waters. See 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 194-202; Annotation, Right of Public in Shore
of InlandNavigable Lake between High- and Low- Water Marks, 40 A.L.R. 3RD 776 (1971).
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public's interest in dryland and submerged land; rather, it believes
this interest extends to the waterbed whether or not the bed is
24 8
covered with water.
3. Conclusion
North Dakota's navigable waterways are public highways
subject to recreational use by the public. The public's interest
extends to water over the shorezone despite section 47-01-15's
grant of this area to riparians. 24 9 The right continues even when
water recedes from the shorezone. While the question of public
recreational rights in navigable waters has been satisfactorily
studied, the second aspect of this Article - the nature of title to the
beds of navigable waterways - requires further analysis of section
47-01-15. The following section examines whether the statute's
grant is void ab initio and in violation of the North Dakota
Constitution.
F.THENVALIDITY OF SECTION

47-01-15

OF THE.NORTH DAKOTA

CENTURY CODE

1. Introduction
While the public maintains significant rights in the shorezone
despite a grant of this area to riparians pursuant to section 47-0115, the statute may be more closely examined to determine if it is
even constitutional.2 5 0 Indeed, this Article analyzes the statute and
concludes that the statute violates the constitutions of the United
States and North Dakota.
2. Section 4 7-01-15 and the United States Constitution
Section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code
originated in a territorial statute. Section 266 was enacted by the
Dakota Territory Legislature in 1877 and provided: "Except where
the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent,
the owner of the upland, when it borders on a navigable lake or
248. State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 231, 625 P.2d 239, 251, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 708
(1981).
249. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978) (landowner takes to low-water mark).
250. An examination of the constitutionality of S 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code
has been made by Mr. Michael Fiergola. The results of his careful work are contained in Note, North
Dakota Century Code Section 47-01-15; DeterminingNorth Dakota's Interest in the Beds of Navigable Waters, 59
N.D.L. REV. 211 (1983).
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stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low-water
mark ....
",251 .The
territorial legislature, however, was without
authority to make such a grant. Therefore, the statute was void
from the beginning.
The equal footing doctrine establishes section 266's invalidity.
To give the statute effect would deny North Dakota its right to
enter the Union on an equal footing with other states. The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that during territorial
days the federal government holds the beds of navigable waters in
25 3
trust for the future states.252 In the 1913 decision of Scott v. Lattig,
the Court stated it had settled long ago "that lands underlying
navigable waters within the several States belong to the respective
States in virtue of their sovereignty.. and that each new State, upon
its admission to the Union, becomes endowed with the same rights
and powers in this regard as the older ones. ' 25 4 To ensure this
equality Congress "has constantly acted upon the theory... that the
navigable waters and the soils under them...shall not be granted
away during the period of territorial government; but... shall be
held by the United States in trust for the future States, when'
organized and admitted into the Union.... 2 5 5
Thus, "before statehood, the United States was without power
to convey title to land under navigable water and deprive future
States of their future ownership. "256
251. TERR. DAK. CIV. CODE S 266 (1877). The present version of S 266, 5 47-01-15 of the North
Dakota Century Code is nearly the same. Section 47-01-15 provides, in relevant part: "Except when'
the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, when it
borders on a navigable lake or stream takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low watermark."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978). For a short history of 5 47-01-15, see Note, supra note 250, at
222.
252. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,
57(1893).
253. 227 U.S. 229 (1913).
254. Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1913); see also Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 434 (1892) ("[there can be no distinction between the several States.. in the character of
the jurisdiction, sovereignty and dominion which they may possess....' ).
255. Shively, 152 U.S. at 49-50; see also Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n,
466 U.S. 198, 205 (1984) (the equal footing doctrine prohibits the federal government from disposing
of a right possessed by a state); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 374 (1977) (courts have established that states have absolute title to the beds of navigable
waters, and that title cannot be defeated by "a provision in the Act admitting the State to the Union
nor a grant from Congress to a third party").
256. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 83 (1922); see also Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337 (1876) (the federal government cannot convey land between the high and
low water on navigable rivers because this space belongs to the state). There are exceptions to the
rule that the federal government cannot convey beds of navigable waters prior to a territory
becoming a state. Such grants may be made by the federal government to perform international
obligations, to improve international and interstate commerce, and for any other public purpose
appropriate to the objects for which territories are held. Shively, 152 U.S. at 48. Even in these
instances, however, disposals of the land under navigable waters during the territorial period are not
lightly to be inferred and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention is plain. United
States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926).
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The Supreme Court's strong language in these decisions
reveals the unique character of land under navigable waters and
makes clear that such land could not be transferred during.
territorial days. Thus, the Dakota Territory Legislature was
without power to deprive North Dakota of such land.
A 1913 decision, United States v. MacKey, 2 57 supports the
proposition thdt a territory cannot convey title to the beds of
navigable water prior to becoming a state. 258 In MacKey the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
considered the validity of a statute adopted by the Oklahoma
Territory Legislature that is much like section 266 of the Dakota
Territory Code. 25 9 The decision is particularly helpful because the
Organic Acts and Constitutional Schedules of Oklahoma and
North Dakota are nearly the same. 260 MacKey involved disputed
ownership of the bed of the Arkansas River. 261 MacKey owned
land adjacent to the river, claimed title to the low-water mark, and
executed oil and gas leases for this land. 262 The United States
claimed the riverbed was owned by the Creek Indian Tribe. 263 The
State of Oklahoma argued it owned the bed under the equal footing
doctrine because of its navigability, and issued mining leases for the
same area as had MacKey. 264 Finding the river navigable, the court
placed ownership in Oklahoma. 26s This ruling, however, did not
extinguish MacKey's claim because the Oklahoma Territory
Legislature, drawing upon laws of the Dakota Territory, adopted a
statute identical to section 266.266 When Oklahoma became a state
26 7
in 1907 this law was included among the Oklahoma statutes.
Citing Supreme Court decisions referred to above, as well as
others, the court determined a territorial legislature could not
257. 214 F. 137 (D. Okla. 1913), rev'd, 216 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1914).
258. United States v. MacKey, 214 F. 137, 149 (D.Okla. 1913).

259. Id. at 148.
260. Id.; see The Organic Law of North Dakota, Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, 5
6, 12 Stat. 239, 241, repealedby Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 202, 47 Stat. 1429, reprintedin 13 N.D. CENT.
CODE at 57 (1981). Section 6 of The Organic Law of North Dakota provides: "And be it further
enacted, that the legislative power of the territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation
consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act; but no law shall
be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil...." Id. Section 6 of the Organic Act of
Oklahoma provided: "That the legislative power of the territory shall extend to all rightful subjects
of legislation, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, but no law shall
be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil." Organic Act of Oklahoma, Act of May 2,
1890, ch. 182, S 6, 26 Stat. 81,84, reprintedin OKLA. STAT. ANN. OrganicAct, 5 6 (West 1981).

261. MacKey, 214 F. at 139.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.

265. Id. at 149.
266. Id. at 148.

267. Id.
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violate the policy expressed by these decisions by granting riparians
land below high water. 268 The Oklahoma Territory Legislature's
269
attempt to do so was declared void.
Along with Supreme Court decisions expressing the equal
footing doctrine, the court examined section 6 of the Organic Act of
the Oklahoma Territory which defined the authority of the
territorial legislature as follows: "That the legislative power of the
territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of
soil."270 In light of Supreme Court decisions, the court stated it was
"convinced that the defining of the rights of riparian owners in the
beds of navigable streams is not a rightful subject of territorial
legislation. ' 271 If Congress could not do this, the territorial
legislature, but a creature of Congress, could not. 27 2 Section 6 of
Oklahoma's Organic Act is nearly identical to section 6 of the
27 3
Organic Act of the Dakota Territory.
The court in MacKey went on to discuss how adoption of the
statute into the code of the State of Oklahoma affected its
validity. 27 4 Being void when adopted, the court stated the statute
275
did not become law when Oklahoma adopted the territorial laws.
This conclusion was based on section 2 of the Schedule of
Oklahoma's Constitution that provided: "All laws in force in the
territory of Oklahoma at the time of the admission of the state into
the Union, which are not repugnant to the Constitution, and which
are not locally inapplicable, shall be extended to and remain in
force in the state of Oklahoma until they expire by their own
limitation or are altered or repealed by law." 276 Having no effect
when enacted by the territorial legislature, the statute was not one
of the "laws in force in the territory" and, therefore, did not
become part of Oklahoma law. 277 Section 2 of the Schedule of
North Dakota's Constitution was nearly identical to section 2 of
278
Oklahoma's Schedule.
268. Id. at 149.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 148; see The Organic Act of Oklahoma, reprinted in OKLA STAT. ANN. Organic Act, S 6
(West 1981).
271. MacKey, 214 F. at 149.
272. Id.
273. Compare The Organic Law § 6, reprinted in 13 N.D. CENT. CODE at 57 with Organic Act S 6,
reprinted in OKLA. CONST. For the text of Organic Law of the North Dakota Constitution, see supra
note 260. For the text of the Organic Act of the Oklahoma Constitution, see supra note 260.
274. MacKey, 214 F. at 149-50.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 148.
277. Id. at 149-50.
278. 13 N.D. CENT. CODE at 267, § 2 ("All laws now in force in the territory of Dakota, which
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Although the trial court's decision in MacKey was overturned
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 27 9 the
reversal was due to a procedural error by the trial court. 18 0 The
Court of Appeals did not comment on the trial court's substantive
reasoning. Therefore, although MacKey is not binding law, its
analysis remains helpful in understanding the effect of section 266
of the Dakota Territory Code. Indeed, Znother federal court has
28 2
found the reasoning of MacKey sound. 28 1 Also, in State v. Nolegs
the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered and adopted this
reasoning in a property dispute over the bed of the Arkansas River.
In Nolegs, two riparians asserted ownership to the middle of the
river and the state asserted title to the entire bed.2 83 The riparians
argued that the river was nonnavigable and, therefore, the state
owned nothing.2 8 4 One of the riparians argued that even if the river
was navigable he still owned to the low-water mark. 28 5 His claim of
ownership to the low-water mark was based on the same statute at
issue in MacKey. 286 The court stated:
It is earnestly contended by defendants... that the act

of the territorial Legislature of Oklahoma... which
attempted to vest the title of riparian owners on navigable
waters in this state at low-water mark, should control in
this case. This identical question arose in U.S. v.
MacKey,...and it is therein held that the Legislature of

the territory...had no power to enact such a law, and it is
therefore void, was not carried over, and did not become
a law in the state of Oklahoma. The reasoning of the
court is sound... and we are fully convinced that the
Legislature of the territory... had no power to confer title

in riparian owners of the land below high-water mark in
are not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by "theirown limitations
or be altered or repealed.") (repealed by N.D. CONST. art. amend. 100, ch. 691, 5 1, 1979 N.D.
Laws 1726.
279. 216 F. 126 (8th Cir. 1914).
280. United States v. MacKey, 216 F. 126, 126 (8th Cir. 1914). The defendants filed demurrers
to the complaint. Id. These were to be treated as motions to dismiss in which all allegations in the,
complaint were deemed admitted. Id. at 126-27. The United States' complaint alleged that thel
Arkansas River below high water was owned by the Creek Nation. Id. at 127. The district court'
dismissed the complaint on the ground Oklahoma owned the bed. Id. at 127-28. The court's failure
to accept as true the complaint's allegation of title required the Court of Appeals to overturn the
court's dismissal of the action.
281. United States v. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co., 249 F. 609, 614 (W.D. Okla. 1918), aff'd
270 F. 100 (8th Cir. 1920), aff'd sub nom., Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S.
77, (1922).
282. 40 Okla. 479,
-, 139 P. 943 (1914).
283. State v. Nolegs, 40 Okla. 479, __, 139 P. 943, 944 (1914).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. State v. Nolegs, 40 Okla. 479,
, 139 P. 943, 947 (1914).
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navigable waters which were held in trust by the United
States for the then future and now state of Oklahoma;
that said territorial act was in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States, and never in force as a
law in Oklahoma Territory, and, when statehood
intervened, said statute did not come within the adopting
provisions of the state Constitution, and never became a
28 7
law of this state.
Based on the Oklahoma decisions, the Legislature of the
Dakota Territory was without authority to enact section 266.288
Section 6 of the Dakota Territory's organic law confined the
authority of its legislature "to all rightful subjects of the legislature
consistent with the Constitution of the United States .... ,"289 Since
the United States Constitution establishes the right of states to land
beneath navigable water, 290 section 266 was unconstitutional. The
adoption of territorial laws into North Dakota's first code did not
include section 266, because section 2 of the Schedule of North
Dakota's Constitution provides that the state only accepted "laws
in force in the territory.... ",291 Thus, section 266 was never a law in
292
force, because it was void upon enactment.
3. Section 47-01-15 and the North Dakota Constitution
The essence of article X, section 18 of the North Dakota
Constitution prohibits the state from making gifts to private
persons. 2 93 The North Dakota Supreme Court has not directly
287. Id. A similar issue arose in Gable v. Angle, 7 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Okla. 1933). A statute'of
the Oklahoma Territory relating to the ownership of the beds of nonnavigable rivers was adopted
into the state code. Id. at 968. Because the statute conflicted with the federal statute, the court
determined the territorial legislature was without power to enact the statute and it was, therefore,
void. Id.
288. See Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, §6, 12 Stat. 239, 241, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch.
202, 47 Stat. 1429, reprintedin 13 N.D. CENT. CODE at 57 (1981).
289. Id.
290. E.g., Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. at 374; United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75
(1931).
291. For the text of Schedule 2 of the North Dakota Constitution, seesupra note 278.
292. It might be argued that since the substance of S 47-01-15 appeared in 1877 and has been
reenacted in revisions of the code, the legislature implicitly made a decision to transfer to riparians
the shorezone on navigable lakes and streams. A similar argument was put to the Michigan Supreme
Court, although the statute was different than § 47-01-15. See Dearborn Township v. Dail, 334
55 N.W.2d 201, 204 (1952). The court said the reenactment of the statute by the
Mich. 673, -,
Michigan Legislature "has no determinative affect here other than as further proof of the long period
in which it has been in effect without challenge." Id. at -_, 55 N.W.2d at 204.
293. N.D. CONST. art. X, S 18 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
The state, any county or city may make internal improvements and may engage in
any industry, enterprise or business, not prohibited by article XX of the constitution,
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addressed the question whether this provision is violated by the
grant to riparians of the shorezone on navigable waterways as
provided by section 47-01-15.294 The court has, however, in
several decisions assumed the statute grants fee title.2 95 If squarely
presented with the issue, two of its decisions would likely guide the
court's analysis of the constitutionality of section 47-01-15.
The first decision is Solberg v. State Treasurer.296 Solberg
defaulted on a mortgage in 1937.297 To help satisfy his debt he
quitclaimed the mortgaged land to the state. 2 98 In 1946 Solberg
repurchased the land, though the state reserved ownership of fifty
percent of the land's minerals.2

99

A few years later the legislature

enacted a law requiring the state to release such reservations to
debtors who had repurchased. 0 0 When Solberg requested a release
the State Treasurer refused, claiming such a transfer would violate
section 185 of the constitution, the predecessor of article X, section
18.301 The court, finding the statute required the state to make a
gift, declared it unconstitutional.

30 2

The Solberg opinion relied on Herr v. Rudolf, 30 3 a North Dakota
decision,

and

Winters v.

Myers,30 4 a Kansas decision.

Winters

involved islands on navigable rivers. 30 5 By law, these belonged to
the state. 30 6 In 1913, however, the legislature enacted a statute
giving, under certain circumstances, islands to riparians. 30 7 When
the Kansas Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
statute by which the state holds the islands in trust, it referred to the
case of Illinois Central Railroad, and held that the statute was
unconstitutional.

308

but neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof shall otherwise loan or give
its credit or make donations to or in aid of any individual, association or corporation
except for reasonable support of the poor, nor subscribe to or become the owner of
capital stock in any association or corporation.
N.D. CONST. art. X, S 18.
294. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-01-15 (1978) (landowner takes to low watermark).
295. See, e.g., Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955); State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182,
190, 20 N.W.2d 668, 671 (1945) (granting riparian owner fee title to the low-water mark, but not to
river beds).
296. 78 N.D. 806, 53 N.W.2d 49 (1952).
297. Solberg v. State Treasurer, 78 N.D. 806, 807, 53 N.W.2d 49, 50 (1952).
298. Id. at 807, 53 N.W.2d at 50.
299. Id. at 808, 53 N.W.2d at 50.
300. Id. at 809-10, 53 N.W.2d at 50-51;Act ofFeb. 28, 1951, ch. 231, 1951 N.D. LAws 324.
301. N.D. CONST. art. XII, S 185 (renumbered art. X, S 18). For a short history of article X,
18 of the North Dakota Constitution, see Note, supra note 250, at 233-34.
302. Solberg, 78 N.D. at 817, __,
53 N.W.2d at 55.
303. 75 N.D. 91, 25 N.W.2d 916 (1947).
304.92 Kan. 414, 140 P. 1033 (1914).
305. Winters v. Myers, 92 Kan. at 414, 140 P. at 1033.
306. Id. at __,
307. Id. at__,
308. Id. at__,

140 P. at 1035.
140 P. at 1035.
140 P. at 1037-38.
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The issue in Herr was similar to that in Solberg. In Herr, land
was transferred to North Dakota after Rudolf defaulted on a
loan. 30 9 Herr offered to buy the land from the State for $2600 and
was willing to pay $3000.310 The State, however, intended to sell
the land to Rudolf's son under a statute giving previous owners,
their spouses and descendants a preferential right to repurchase. 3 11
Such right could be exercised by paying the fair market value of the
land. 312 Rudolf's son tendered the fair market value, $2500.313
Herr requesied a restraining order to prevent the sale of the land to
Rudolf's son, based on the North Dakota Constitution's
prohibition of gifts. 3 14 Without hesitation, the Supreme Court
affirmed the granting of the injunction, finding the statute required
315
the State to make an unconstitutional gift.
Neither Solberg nor Herr concerned public trust land, the kind
of property section 47-01-15 seeks to transfer.3 16 Since the supreme
court applied article X, section 18 to the transfer of interests the
State holds in its proprietary capacity, the court would likely apply
the provision to transfers of land the State holds in its sovereign
capacity as trustee for the public. 3 17 Indeed, article X, section 18
requires swifter application to protect trust land than it does to
protect other land. 3 18 Thus, if section 47-01-15 is interpreted as
granting fee title to riparians, it is likely a court would declare it an
3 19
unconstitutional gift.
309. Herrv. Rudolf, 75 N.D. 91, 94, 25 N.W.2d 916, 918 (1947).
310. Id. at 94-95, 25 N.W.2d at 91'8.
311. Id. at95, 25 N.W.2d at 918.
312. Id. at98, 25 N.W.2d at 920.
313. See id. at 95, 25 N.W.2d at 918.
314. Id. at94, 25 N.W. 2d at 919.
315. Id. at 103, 25 N.W.2d at 922.
316. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-01-15 (1978) (landowner takes to low watermark).
317. For decisions voiding territorial laws that contravene a state's later adopted constitution,
see Miller v. Heller, 68 Ariz. 352,
-, 206 P.2d 569, 573 (1949); State ex rel. Gilmore v. High, 14
Ariz. 429, __,
130 P. 611, 613 (1913); State ex rel. R.J. EdWards, Inc. v. Keith, 179 Okla. 563,
,66 P.2d 1059, 1063 (1937); Duncan Township v. Stayr, 106 Wash. 514, , 180 P. 476, 478
(1919). On a closely related issue, that is, the implicit repeal of statutes conflicting with subsequently
adopted constitutional provisions, see Timm v. Schoenwald, 400 N.W.2d 260, 266 (N.D. 1987)
(statute is not repealed by implication with the adoption of constitutional provision or amendment
unless the statute is repugnant to or in conflict with the new constitutional provision or amendment);
State ex rel. Agnew v. Schneider, 253 N.W.2d 184, 195-96 (N.D. 1977) (statute survives adoption of
new provision to constitution unless it is repugnant to the article); Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D* 713,
24 N.W.2d 737, 743 (1946) (same); Kniep v. Herseth, 87 S.D. 642,
-, 214 N.W.2d 93, 101
(1974) (same).
318. See N.D. CONST. art. X, § 18. For the text of article X, § 18 of the North Dakota
Constitution, see supra note 293.
319. See N.D. -CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978) (landowner takes to low watermark). Michael
Fiergola, the author of a student note, also concluded that § 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code might violate the North Dakota Constitution. See Note, supra note 250, at 237. Fiergola points
out, however, that because courts prefer to interpret statutes in a way that avoids constitutional
defects, a court could interpret § 47-01-15 as not granting fee title, but merely a license revocable at
will. See id. at 237-39.
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THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO USE
OVERLYING PRIVATE PROPERTY

WATERWAYS

A.

INTRODUCTION

The first part of this Article explained the public has the right
to use North Dakota's navigable waterways for general recreational
purposes, a right which is settled. Legal problems that do arise with
navigable waterways concern the geographic extent of the public's
rights in light of section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code, as well as the often ticklish matter of determining whether a
waterway was navigable in 1889, thereby placing its soil in state
ownership. This part of the Article discusses public rights in water
overlying private property. Once it is known whether a waterway is
or is not navigable for purposes of title, the law regarding the
geographic extent of a riparian's ownership of the bed is clear.
Significant legal questions do arise, however, with the public's
right to use waterways overlying private property.
B.

TITLE TO THE-BEDS OF NONNAVIGABLE WATERWAYS

Ownership by the United States of land that was to become
North Dakota included the beds of nonnavigable bodies of water.
This title rested on the common-law principle that ownership of
land abutting nonnavigable waterways included the subaqueous
soil.320 As proprietor, the United States was free to retain title to all
or any part of the bed when conveying uplands. 32 1 If the United
States failed to expressly reserve the bed from a conveyance,
interpretation of the extent of title conveyed is a question of State
law. 322
In North Dakota, persons owning land adjoining a
nonnavigable lake own the bed in severalty, their boundary lines
converging in the center of the lake bed. 323 For nonnavigable rivers
the rule is expressed in section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota
320. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1935); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574,
595-96 (1922); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1891).
321. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 29; Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. at 594-95.
Admission to statehood did not vest title in North Dakota of lands underlying nonnavigable
waterways. State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314, 317, 36 N.W.2d 330, 332 (1949).
322. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. at 594; Brewer- Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260
U.S. 77, 88 (1922); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508, 519 (1903); Hardin, 140 U.S. at 380, 384;
Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891); Beck, supra note 20, at 437-38.
323. Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 470, 37 N.W.2d 488, 492 (1949); Brignall v.
Hannah, 34 N.D. 174, 185-86, 157 N.W. 1042., 1045(1916).

1988]

NORTH DAKOTA WATERWAYS

Century Code, which provides: "In all cases when the opposite
banks of any stream not navigable belong to different persons, the
stream and the bed thereof shall become common to both.''324
Uncertainty whether "common" meant opposite shore owners
own the bed as tenants in common or that each own a part of the
326
bed, 3 25 was resolved in Amoco Oil Co. v. State Highway Department.
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Amoco Oil Co. determined
that common meant each riparian owns to the center of the
stream. 327 Should ownership of the opposite banks be in the same
person, such person owns the entire bed.
C.

THE. NATURE OF A RIPARIAN'S INTEREST IN THE- SOIL OF
NONNAVIGABLE WATERWAYS

The ancient legal maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum,
proclaims that whomever owns the ground has exclusive right to
everything above.3 21 Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court
applied the cujus est solum maxim to deny public recreational rights
in water over private property. In People v. Emmert, 329 the
defendants used rafts to float down a nonnavigable river. 330 The
river, while nonnavigable for title purposes under the federal
navigability test, was sufficiently navigable for recreational craft. 33 1
When the defendants reached that part of the river overflowing
property of the Ritschard Cattle Company, they were arrested and
charged with criminal trespass. 332 Part of the Court's rationale for
upholding their conviction was based on the statute expressing the
cujus est solum maxim. 33 3 The statute provided: "The ownership of
space above lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in
the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right 6f
flight of aircraft." ' 334 The Colorado Supreme Court found the
statute gave the Ritschard Cattle Company "exclusive control of
324. N.D. CENT. CODE S 47-01-15 (1978).
325. Beck, supra note 20, at 439.
326. 262 N.W.2d 726 (N.D. 1978).
327. Amoco Oil Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978). In Amoco Oil
Co., the court defined the center of a stream as "the line midway between the opposite shore lines
when the water is at its ordinary stage and neither swollen by freshets nor shrunken by droughts, no
account being taken of main channel current or of line of greatest depth." Id. (quoting I PATTON ON
TITLES

140 (2d ed.)).

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 210.
198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025 (1979).
People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137,
-, 597 P.2d 1025, 1026 (1979).
Id. at - , 597 P.2d at 1026.
Id. at -_, 597 P.2d at 1026.
Id. at -. , 597 P.2d at 1027; see COLO. REV. STAT. S 41-1-107 (1984) (ownership of space).
COLO.REv. STAT. S 41-1-107 (1984).
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everything above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional and
statutory limitations, restrictions and regulations. ' 3 35 The court
concluded that since the defendants had not received the
company's permission to' use the water, they committed a
trespass. 336
Use of the cujus est solum maxim by Colorado in Emmert is an
anomaly. Generally, it is accepted that ownership of the bed of a
waterway does not carry with it ownership of the water. 337 The
riparian's private right of property is not in the corpus of the
water 338 but in the mere usufructuary right to take water from the
stream or lake and put it to beneficial use. 339 As one court stated,
"[i]t is ancient learning that the right to flowing.water is incident to
the title to land, and that there is no right of property in such water
in the sense that it is the subject of exclusive appropriation and
335. Emmert, 198 Colo. at ___, 597 P.2d at 1027.
336. Id. North Dakota has a statute similar to S 41-1-107 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
Compare N.D. CENT. CODE S 2-03-03 (1987) (ownership of space) with COLO. REV. STAT. 5 41-1-107

(1984) (ownership of space). Section 2-03-03 of the North Dakota Century Code provides, "The
ownership of space above the lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the several
owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of flight described in section 2-03-04." N.D.
CENT. CODE S 2-03-03 (1987). For the text of 5 41-1-107 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, see supra
text accompanying note 334. While North Dakota has a similar statute, the result reached by the
Colorado Supreme Court's use of the cujus est solum maxim is not inevitable. For example, an
application of the maxim rejects the reasoning of United States v. Causby. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). In
Causby, the plaintiff was damaged by military planes taking off from and landing at a nearby airbase.
Id. at 259. In determining the applicability of cujus est solumn, the United States Supreme Court stated
that the maxim has "no place in the modern world." Id. at 261. Moreover, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the maxim should not be applied literally.
Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654-55
(1936), In Hinman, the court of appeals stated the maxim is but a figurative phrase to express
complete ownership of land and the right to whatever space above it a landowner can reasonably use.
Id.
337. E.g., 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE.NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 137-38
(1971) (stating the general rule is that no one owns the actual corpus of water); 1 WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 234, at 213-14 (same); Larson, The Development of Water Rights and Suggested Improvements in
the Water Law of North Dakota, 38 N.D.L. REV. 243, 243 (1962) (same). Roscoe Pound has stated:

Recently a strong tendency has arisen to regard running water and wild game as res
publicae; to hold that they are owned by the state, or better, that they are assets of
society which are not capable of private appropriation or ownership except under
regulations that protect the general social interest.... [I]t is changing the whole water
law of the western states. It means that in a crowded world the social interest in the use
and conservation of natural media has become more important than individual
interests of substance.
Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 234 (1914).
338. E.g., Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641,
-, 658 P.2d 287, 305-06 (1982) (corpus of

water is not subject to private ownership); Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 93 Mont. 248,
17 P.2d 1074, 1076 (1933) (same); Northport Irrigation Dist. v. Jess, 215 Neb. 152, -_, 337
N.W.2d 733, 738 (1983) (same); Adams v. Partage Irrigation Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1,
72 P.2d 648, 652 (1937) (same); Wiel, Running Water, 22 HARV. L. REV. 190, 213 (1909)
(same).
__

339. E.g., Robinson, 65 Haw. at __

, 658 P.2d at 305-06 (no simple private ownership in the

water in nonnavigable waterways exists, but merely a usufructuary right that entitles the private
owner to the use and enjoyment of the water); W. HUTCHINS supra note 337, at 137 (same); Larson,
supra note 337, at 243-44 (same); Wiel, supra note 338 at 213 (same).
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dominion. ' 340 This rule is due to the need to preserve the purity
and flow of water for others and because running water cannot be
34 1
possessed in a way that is essential to ownership.
One commentator has stated that "[s]ince nature's bounty
obviously does not belong to anyone by common principles of
justice - not being the product of anyone's labor, cultivation or
discovery - to define it as the exclusive property of someone was to
deem that person more important or worthy than others.' '342 This
idea also rejects the application cujus est solum to land beneath water.
Moreover, this concept is expressed in numerous North Dakota
statutes and decisions. For example, the state engineer and state
water commission have extensive statutory authority to regulate
water. 343 This regulatory authority indicates that water should be
controlled for the public.
Further contradicting the cujus est solum maxim is the North
Dakota Legislative Assembly's declaration that all waters in rivers
and lakes "belong to the public;'' 344 that the public's general
welfare, including its opportunities for social and economic growth,
depend "in large measure upon the optimum protection,
management, and wise utilization of all of the water...resources of
the state; ' 34- and that the public's well-being is to be "the
overriding determinant in considering the best use.. .of
water...resources. ' ' 34 6 In 1987 the legislature declared its policy
"that water is one of North Dakota's most important natural
resources, and the protection, development, and management of
North Dakota's water resources is essential for the long-term public
health, safety, general welfare, and economic security of North
34 7
Dakota and its citizens."
North Dakota case law also supports the proposition that the
owner of a lake or river bed does not have exclusive control of the
water. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission v. Board of
340. Akron Canal & Hydraulic Co. v. Fontaine, 72 Ohio App. 93, -,
50 N.E.2d 897, 901
(1943).
341. Robinson, 65 Haw. at -. , 658 P.2d at 306; W. HuTcHIs supra note 337, at 137-38; seealso
Larson, supra note 337, at 243-44 (additional reasons for recognizing public ownership of water
include its effect upon land values; public uses such as navigation, recreation and-fishing; and the
complexity of projects necessary to develop a water supply).
342. Sax, supra note 215, at 191.
343. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE S 61-02-14 (1985) (creating and outlining the powers and duties of
the water commission); id. S 61-03-21 (creating and outlining the powers and duties of the state
engineer); id. S 61-03-21.1 (same); id. S 61-03-21.2 (same); id. S 61-04-02 (same); id. S 61-04-17
(same); id. S 61-04-23 (same); id. S 61-15-02 (same).
344. Id. S 61-01-01.
345. Id. S 61-01-26(1).
346. Id. S 61-01-26(2).
347. Id. S 61-32-01 (Supp. 1987).
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Managers34 involved an attempt by the State to control drainage of
water from Rush Lake. 349 Referring to the lake bed's private
ownership, the court stated:
The State does not lose its right to exercise authority over
a lake merely because its lake bed is subject to private
ownership. As the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted
'[t]he ownership of beds of streams and lakes is quite a
350
different matter from the right to control waters.'
Furthermore,

in Baeth v.

Hoisveen,3 5

a case involving the

constitutionality of a water appropriation statute, the court noted
that North Dakota is a semi-arid state. 352 The court concluded:
"Therefore, concern for the general welfare could well require that
the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest
extent of which they are capable.... ,,353 Such a policy could not be

met if the ownership of subaqueous soil controls use of the water.
Finally, a provision of the North Dakota Constitution
provides: "All flowing streams and natural watercourses shall
forever remain the property of the state for mining, irrigating and
manufacturing purposes. '

354

So long as this provision is not

interpreted as divesting riparian rights "it should be construed as
placing the integrity of our water courses beyond the control of
individual owners.' ,a35

In light of North Dakota's constitution, statutes, and its
supreme court decisions, it is a flawed argument that the owner of a
river or lake bed has absolute control of the water above. 356 Indeed,
courts of other states when considering public recreational rights in
348. 332 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1983).
349. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n v. Board of Managers, 332 N.W.2d

254, 255 (N.D. 1983).
350. Id. at 258 (citations omitted).
351. 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968).
352. Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968).
353. Id.; see also United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). Although the court in United Plainsmen only stated the public trust
doctrine requires that the State engage in short and long term planning before permitting large
appropriations, it implied a willingness to give the doctrine a broader application to North Dakota
waters. Id. at 463.
354. N.D. CONST. art. XI, 5 3.
355. Bigelow v. Draper, 6 N.D. 152, 163, 69 N.W. 570, 573 (1896).
356. Beck and Hart comment that a North Dakota riparian's control of waters "is undoubtedly
minimal."

Beck & Hart, The Nature and Extent of Water Rights in North Dakota, 51 N.D.L. REV. 249,

281 (1974). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "[r]ights, property or
otherwise, which are absolute against the world are certainly rare, and water rights are not among
them." United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945); see also Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (justice Holmes stating the public interest in
water rights is omnipresent, thereby diminishing the interest of a private individual).
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water over private land have commonly stated: "The real question
here is not of title but whether the public has the right of fishing and
navigation.' ,

Thus far this section has taken a negative approach to the issue
of the public's right to use waterways on private property, and this
approach is unsatisfactory because it only generally describes
limitations upon the riparian's title and fails to define the nature
and extent of public rights in waters over private property. This
Article now turns to the positive approach and present theories
affirmatively establishing public recreational rights.
D.

THEORIES SUPPORTING PUBLIC RECREATIONAL RIGHTS IN
WATERWAYS OVERLYING PRIVATE PROPERTY

There are several theories upon which to base a public
recreational right in waters over private property.358 Some courts
declare a public navigational easement in such waters.3 59 These
decisions are often founded on the importance of water as a natural
resource and the unwillingness to allow landowners the right to
deprive the public of its enjoyment. The public trust doctrine and
statutes have also been used to fashion public rights in water
flowing over private land.3 60 It is not surprising that the public trust
doctrine has been used in this way. The doctrine is an
extraordinarily flexible and dynamic judicial tool that has been
used in numerous ways to limit private property rights in favor of
public interests. Other theories might be used, but they are tied to
the particular facts of individual waterways and do not necessarily
provide a public privilege in all bodies of water nonnavigable for
purposes of title. These theories include custom, prescription,
implied dedication, and the public's status as a licensee of the state
where the state is a riparian landowner.361 This Article concentrates
on the first three theories - the public navigational easement, the
public trust doctrine, and North Dakota statutes - to assess the
357. People ex rel.
Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, -,
97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 454 (1971);
accord Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, -, 528 P.2d
1295, 1298 (1974); State exrel.
Guste v.Two O'Clock Bayou Land Co., 365 So.2d 1174, 1178 (La.
Ct. App. 1978); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1092
(Mont. 1984); State ex rel.
Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, -,
336 N.E.2d
453, 455 (1975); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, -, 462"P.2d 232, 238 (1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 878 (1970); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P:2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961).
358. For a general review of the public's rights in waters over private property, see Annotation,
PublicRights of RecreationalBoating, Fishing, Wading, or the like in InlandStream, the Bed of Which is Privately

Owned, 6 A.L.R. 4th 1030 (1981).
359. See infra notes 362-411 and accompanying text.
360. See infra notes 412-53 and accompanying text.
361. See infra notes 454-63 and accompanying text.
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legality of a citizen's recreational use of North Dakota waterways
the bed of which is in private ownership.
1. The Public NavigationalEasement
Courts from states other than North Dakota have been
confronted with disputes between water recreationists and
.landowners. More than a few of their decisions establish a public
navigational easement in water over private property. Before
looking at these decisions it is important to note that while the
federal test of navigability is binding upon states for determining
title questions, each state is free to decide for itself the nature and
extent of public rights in its waters.3 62 Thus, a state may apply a
less stringent standard than the federal title test in addressing
3 63
questions of public use.

California courts have had extensive experience with the rights
of the public in the state's waterways. 364 Their first words on public
recreational rights came in the 1912 decision of Forestier v.
Johnson.365 Forestier claimed ownership of the bed of a waterway
that was influenced by the tides. 3 66 During low tide the bed was
nearly dry and during high tide it was used by the public in small
boats for fishing, hunting, and general navigation. 367 Although the
court's decision in favor of public use relied on the public trust
doctrine and California's Constitution, the court also seemed to
find the public had a common-law navigational easement in the
waterway. 368 This easement was again expressed in Bohn v.
Albertson, 369 which involved a tract of land that flooded when the
San Joaquin River broke a levee. 37 0 During the many years the
362. See Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 567-68, 127
Cal. Rptr. 830, 834 (1976) (navigation for use is a matter governed by state law); Bott v.
Commission of Natural Resources, 415 Mich. 45, _,
327 N.W.2d 838, 844 n.18 (1982) (same);
Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 1980) (same);
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, -,
145 N.W. 816, 819 (1914) (same); Day v.
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961)(same); see also Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) (property ownership is governed by the laws of the
states).
363. See, e.g., Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360,
528 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1974) (federal navigability test used to establish title does not preclude the
court from applying a less restrictive state test to establish a right of public passage); State v.
Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, __,
503 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1972) (many states have adopted a less
restrictive test to determine the public's right to use waterways).
364. For a discussion of California decisions pertaining to public recreational rights, see Frank,
supra note 25, at 614-24.
365. 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156(1912).
366. Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 27, 127 P. 156, 157 (1912).
367. Id. at 27-29, 127 P. at 157-58.
368. See id. at 33-35, 39-40, 127 P. at 160,.162.
369. 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951).
370. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738,
-, 238 P.2d 128, 129 (1951).
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land remained flooded, the public went on the tract in small boats
to fish. 3 "1 Owners of the underlying land sought to bar the public
and require users to pay a fee. 37 2 The court stated the question was
not title to the land, but whether the public has a right to navigate
the water. 373 Because the water was sufficient to float boats, the
374
court held it subject to a public right of navigation.
Forestierand Bohn prepared the way for People v. Mack, 375 which
clearly articulated a broad public navigational easement in water
over private property. In Mack, landowners obstructed navigation
and fishing in the Fall River by building booms, fences, and low
bridges across it.376 The court stated: "It hardly needs citation of
authority that the rule is that a navigable stream may be used by
the public for boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, and all
recreational purposes. ' 377 The court then described navigable
waters as those "capable of being navigated by oar or motor
propelled small craft. "378 The rule that navigation is established
simply by the suitability of water for public use, was based on a
recognition of ever-increasing population and leisure time and the
need for recreational areas. 379 Thus, "it is extremely important
that the public not be denied use of recreational water by applying
the narrow and outmoded interpretation of 'navigability." 380 Mack
expressed the recreational boating test of navigability, 381 a test
382
followed in other California decisions.
California courts are not alone in declaring the existence of a
public easement in waterways navigable by pleasure boats. A re3 83
creational boating test to establish public rights exists in Idaho,
371. 107 Cal. App. 2d at __,238 P.2d at 129.
372. 107 Cal. App. 2d at.__, 238 P.2d at 129.
373. Id. at-,
238 P.2d at 135.
374. Id. at -_,238 P.2d at 135, 137, 140-41. The court noted, however, that because the'land
was privately owned, the owners had a right to reclaim it, thereby destroying public use. Id.at _
,
238 P.2d at 135.
375. 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971).
376. People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1043, 97 Cal. Rptr. 448, 449 (1971).
377. Id. at 1045, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
378. Id. at 1050, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
379. Id. at 1045, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
380. Id. at 1045, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 451.
381. See Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 568, 127
Cal. Rptr. 830, 835 (1976).
382. See, e.g., People v. Sweetser, 72 Cal..App. 3d 278, 283, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (1977)
("In this state the public has a right to use for boating, swimming, fishing, hunting and all other
recreational purposes, any part of a river that can be navigated by small recreational or pleasure
boats, even though the river bed is privately owned").
383. Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, -,
528
P.2d 1295, 1297-98 (1974); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Idaho 561,
-, 95 P.. 499, 505 (1908)
(stating in dicta that if the riparian owner has title to the beds, then that title "is subject to practically
the same trusts to which it would be subject if it was in the public").
384. State ex rel. Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, -, 336 N.E.2d 453,
457 (1975); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoon, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 2d 193, -,
163
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Ohio, 384 Arkansas, 8 5 Oregon,3a 6 Utah,38 7 and New York.3 8 8 Other
states have decisions that if read broadly might also establish a
recreational boating test for purposes of determining public
rights.38 9 As discussed below the incidents of this right are broad.3 9 0
The policy motivating decisions declaring a navigational
easement may be summarized by quoting a Wisconsin decision:
"Courts have recognized, and now more than ever before
recognize, the public's interest in pleasure and sports as a measure
of public health. "391 The rule, however, is not universal. Though
most of the decisions rejecting it, or its expansive version, are
N.E.2d 373, 375, 378 (1959); Coleman v. Schaeffer, 163 Ohio St. 2d 202,
-, 126 N.E.2d 444,
446-47 (1955). In Mentor Harbor the court also stated: "A natural watercourse does not lose its
character as a public watercourse because a part of its channel has been artificially created. Nor is the
channel of a naturally navigable watercourse made private because of reasonable improvements put
upon it." Mentor Harbor, 170 Ohio St. 2d at-__, 163 N.E.2d at 377; see People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc.
2d 373, -, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423, 431-33 (Police Ct. 1957) (the public right of navigation followed the
public waters when the waters naturally, or by artificial means were made to submerge private land),
appealallowed, 7 Misc. 2d 373, 177 N.Y.S.2d 425 (Suffolk County Ct. 1958), appealdismissed sub nam.,

In re Kraemer, 7 A.D.2d 644, 180 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958), aff'd sub nom., Kraemer v.
County Court, 6 N.Y.2d 363, 160 N.E.2d 633, 189 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1959); see also Port Acres
Sportsman's Club v. Mann, 541 S.W.2d 847, 849-50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (when body of water
became navigable, the riparian retained title to the waterbed, but could not claim an exclusive right
to fish on the newly-created navigable body).
385. State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227, __,
595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
843 (1981). For a discussion of Mclroy, see Note, Public Recreation and the Navigability Test: State v.

Mcllroy, 21 URn. LAw ANN. 287, 299 (1981) (concluding that the Arkansas court's adoption of a
recreational test to determine the public's right to use the waterway would unjustly deprive a
riparian of a previously accorded property right without just compensation).
386. Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Or. 625, -, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (1936); Guilliams v. Beaver
Lake Club, 90Or. 13,.-, 175P. 437,441 (1918).
387. J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
388. Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 Misc. 2d 232,
-, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (N.Y. App. Div.
1960); Kraener, 7 Misc. 2d at __,

164 N.Y.S. 2d at 429.

389. See Brosman v. Gage, 240 Mass. 113, -, 133 N.E. 622, 624 (1921); State v. Bollenbach,
241 Minn. 103, 117, 63 N.W.2d 278, 287-88 (1954); State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 63, 148 N.W.
617, 618 (1914); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 199, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893); Elder v.
Delcour, 354 Mo. 835, -, 269 S.W.2d 17, 24-26 (1954); State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red
River Valley Cc., 51 N.M. 207, -, 182 P.2d 421, 430 (1945); State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603,
__
48 S.E. 586, 588 (1904); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969); Muench v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, -, 53 N.W.2d 514, 519-20, 525 (1952), Nekoosa Edwards Paper
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 201 Wis. 40, -,
228 N.W. 144, 147 (1929); Diana Shooting Club v.
Husting, 156 Wis. 261,
-, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914). For a discussion of the states that have
adopted the recreational boating test, see generally Annotation, supra note 358, at 1041-49.
390. Infra notes 464-502 and accompanying text.
391. Nekoosa Edwards, 201 Wis. at-., 228 N.W. at 147. An authority in the field has written:
Another major historic factor that has influenced the law of the public interest in
inland waters, is that, until recently, the public exerted no substantial demand for the
use of inland waters, other than for transport and, to a lesser extent, for fishing. In
medieval England the general public had neither the time nor the money to make any
substantial demands upon the inland waters. With the passing of time, of course,
people have gradually been able to make more varied uses of our inland waters. But
even so, at the time the United States was formulating its laws concerning inland
waters, a substantial and broad public demand for their use was still undeveloped.
Throughout most of the history of the United States, there has been little occasion for
the law to consider demands other than navigation.
1 WATER RIrHTS, supra note 234, at 203.
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old, 392 a few are more recent. As discussed, the Colorado Supreme
Court in Emmert found the common-law rule granting the
landowner exclusive control of the waters more persuasive than the
recreational boating test. 393 Michigan has also declined to adopt a
recreational boating test. 39 4 It does, however, apply a log floatation

test for determining public use. 395 This test may not, in practical
396
effect, significantly differ from the recreational boating test.
Despite such decisions, there is strong current authority supporting
public use of water over private lands, 3 97 either on the basis of a
liberal definition of navigability, or simply on the basis that the
3 98
waters are suitable for broad public uses.

Whether the North Dakota Supreme Court would follow this
trend is uncertain. Two of its decisions, however, might provide
guidance. In Bissel v. Olson,3 9 9 Olson owned land on both sides of
the Mouse (Souris) River.4 0 0 His construction of a footbridge across
the river connecting his property interfered with Bissel's passenger
boat business. 40 1 Bissel received a mandatory injunction prior to
trial requiring Olson to remove the bridge. 40 2 On appeal, the
supreme court found the case turned on the navigability of the
river. 40 3 Navigability, the court stated, is determined by a
392. E.g., Hartman v. Treise, 36 Colo. 146, -, 84 P. 685, 687 (1905) (owner of river bed has
exclusive right to fish); Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 785-87 (Ill. 1905) (though public may
navigate water over private property it may not fish or hunt there); Lamprey v. Danz, 86 Minn. 317,
90 N.W. 578-80 (1902) (owner of bed has exclusive right to hunt and fish from the waters);
-,
241 P. 328, 331 (1925) (owner of river bed has the
Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, -,
exclusive right to fish) (criticized in Stone, Legal Background on Recreational Use of Montana Waters, 32
MONT. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1971)); Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1935) (owner of bed may fence the property and public has no right to cross fence and boat or
89 S.E.2d 23, 26 (Ct.
fish in water over owner's land); Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, -,
App. 1955) (owner of river bed has the exclusive right to fish); Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347,
-,
63 P. 239, 243 (1900) (owner of river bed may maintain fence across river to prevent passage of
boats and owner has exclusive right to fish) (criticized in Johnson, Riparianand Public Rights to Lakes
and Streams, 35 WASH. L. REV. 580, 612-15 (1960)). For a discussion of cases declining to recognize
the public's right to use waterways over privately owned beds, see Annotation, supra note 358, at
1037-41.
393. People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, -, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1979); see also Bergen Ditch
& Reservoir Co. v. Barnes, 683 P.2d 365, 366-67 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (owner of the surface ground
has the exclusive right to everything above it). For a discussion of Emmert, see supra notes 329-36 and
accompanying text. For an article criticizing the Emmert decision, see Note, People v. Emmert: A Step
Backwardfor Recreational Water Use in Colorado, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 253 (1981) (questioning the

analysis of the court in Emmert due to conflicting precedential case law).
394. Bott v. Commission of Natural Resources, 415 Mich. 45, __,
(1982).
327 N.W.2d at 843-44.
395. Id. at-,
396. Id. at.-, 327 N.W.2d at 842, 847 n.29.
397. 1 WATER RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 214.

398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id.
26 N.D. 60, 143 N.W. 340 (1913).
Bissel v. Olson, 26 N.D. 60, 62-63, 143 N.W. 340, 341 (1913).
Id. at63, 143 N.W. at 341.
Id. at 62, 143 N.W. at 341.
Id. at66, 143 N.W. at 341.

327 N.W.2d 838, 853
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waterway's usefulness for commerce in its natural condition.40 4
Bissel, having failed to prove navigability, was not entitled to an
40 5
injunction.
The court's definition of navigability was the same as that in
the federal navigability test for title. The court seemed unaware
that it need not apply the federal test to resolve matters other than
title. A state is free to fashion its own test of navigability to resolve
questions of public use. Of course, it is possible the court was aware
it could adopt any test of navigability and thought the strict federal
title test was best for answering public use questions in North
Dakota. This, however, is unlikely. There is nothing in the opinion
to indicate the court understood it was not bound by the federal title
test. Thus, Bissel is of doubtful precedential value for answering
public use questions. 40 6 This is also so because of the date the case
was decided: 1913. Modern authority exists which has opened
waterways to the public. Moreover, the increasing leisure time of
the populace creates a need for recreational areas in North Dakota,
and increases the value of water for recreation.
A North Dakota Supreme Court decision that may better
guide a prediction of whether the court will adopt the recreational
boating test is Roberts v. Taylor.40 7 The case involved a property
dispute between landowners on Sweetwater Lake that arose when
the lake receded and each claimed title to the newly exposed lake
bed. 40 8 Significantly, the court noted the case was not a contest
between a riparian owner and one asserting a public right of
navigation on the lake.40 9 The court addressed the problem as one
of navigability for purposes of title. 4 10 After rejecting the federal
title test, which requires capacity for commerce, the court adopted
a recreational test of navigability:
The public status of waters and of their beds in this state
are not to be determined as between parties in this case by
the test of use for commerce of a pecuniary value .... A
public use may not be confined entirely within a use for
trade purposes alone. A use public in its character may
exist when the waters may be used for the convenience
404. Id. at 66-67, 143 N.W. at 341.
405. Id. at 76, 143 N.W. at 345-46.
406. Unique circumstances prodded the court to rule in favor of Olson. For a discussion of the
unique circumstances in Bissel, see supra note 159.
407. 47 N.D. 146,181 N.W. 622(1921).
408. Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 148, 181 N.W. 622, 623-24(1921).
409. Id. at 153, 181 N.W. at 625.
410. Id. at 153, 181 N.W. at 625.
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and enjoyment of the public, whether traveling upon
trade purposes or pleasure purposes. There is a growing
recognition that the utilities of nature, so far as public use
are concerned, are not always to be measured by the sign
of the dollar. Purposes of pleasure, public convenience,
and enjoyment may be public as well as purposes of trade.
Navigation may as surely exist in the former as in the
latter. 411
Without doubt, a recreational boating test has been adopted.
The test, however, was applied in a title dispute. Public rights in
water over private property were not at issue. Thus, Roberts is not
authority that a broad public navigational easement exists in NorthDakota waters. Nevertheless, the language of the above quoted
decision is a strong statement of the public value of water and the
wisdom of ensuring that the public is able to use North Dakota
waterways. Therefore, Roberts is a decision upon which to build an
argument that North Dakota should do what other states have done
and recognize a public navigational easement in water over private
property.
2. The Public Trust Doctrine
A second rationale upon which to base broad public rights in
North Dakota waters is the public trust doctrine. 4 12 There is a
North Dakota case that makes it less than speculative that a North
Dakota court would use the doctrine to enhance the public's
opportunities for water recreation. That decision is United Plainsmen
Association v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission,4 13 the
first North Dakota decision to explicitly recognize the public trust
doctrine.
In United Plainsmen, the United Plainsmen sought an order
restraining the State from allowing water appropriations for the
operation of energy production plants.4 14 The United Plainsmen
argued permits could not be issued until the State had produced a
comprehensive plan for the conservation and development of the
State's natural resources.4 15 The trial court dismissed the action on
411. Id. at 153, 181 N.W. at 626.
412. For a general description of the public trust doctrine, see supra notes 215-34 and
accompanying text.
413. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
414. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 458 (N.D. 1976).
415. Id. at 459.
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the ground that the United Plainsmen's complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 416 The supreme court,
however, stated that a claim based on the public trust doctrine
deserves more than summary dismissal and, indeed, requires the
State to engage in comprehensive planning before permitting large
417
appropriations.
The supreme court confined its recognition of the public trust
doctrine to navigable waters. 418 Unfortunately, its failure to define
navigable waters leads to an uncertainty of the scope of the doctrine
in North Dakota. On the one hand, because the court emphasized
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Central
Railroad,41 9 which dealt with Lake Michigan, a body of water
determined to be navigable under the federal title test, the North
Dakota Supreme Court may only have had in mind waters
navigable under the federal title test.
The public trust doctrine in North Dakota, however, may
reach more waters than those navigable pursuant to the federal test.
First, the court acknowledged the dynamic nature of the
doctrine. 420 Second, the court applied the trust in a way no court
had done so previously.4 2 1 Thus, the court would likely give close
consideration to an argument that the doctrine protects public
recreation in all waters capable of recreational use, whether they
flow over public or private property.
Indeed, the decision may even be interpreted as imposing the
trust on all North Dakota waterways. After stating that the "State
holds the navigable waters... in trust for the public, ' 422 the court
quoted section 61-01-01 of the North Dakota Century Code.
Section 61-01-01 defines those waters that "belong to the
public." 4 23 The definition is comprehensive and includes waters in
lakes and watercourses. 424 The court then stated that the statute
"expresses the Public Trust Doctrine. ' 4 25 Since section 61-01-01
416. Id. at 458.
417. Id. at 463.
418. See id. at 461.
419. Id. at 460-61; see Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For a discussion of
Illinois CentralRailroad, see supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
420. See United Plainsmen, 247 N.W.2d at 463. Also, when the State sought to limit application of
the doctrine to conveyances of trust property, its traditional scope, the court responded: "We do not
understand the doctrine to be so restricted." Id. at 461.
421. In 1983 the California Supreme Court imposed on the State of California a duty like that
required by United Plainsmen, and in doing so relied on the North Dakota decision. National
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446-47, 658 P.2d 709, 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346,
365 (1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); see UnitedPlainsmen, 247 N.W.2d at 463.
422. UnitedPlainsmen, 247 N.W.2d at 461.
423. N.D. CENT. CODE S 61-01-01 (1985).
424. Id. S 61-01-01(1).
425. UnitedPlainsmen, 247 N.W.2d at 462.
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expresses the public trust doctrine, and since the statute includes
waters of all lakes and watercourses, a fair conclusion is that nearly
all waters in the state are subject to the public trust. Furthermore,
because interests protected by the trust include all general
recreational uses, 4 26 it is possible United Plainsmen establishes, in
dicta, public recreational rights in all North Dakota waters. 427 Such
a ruling would not be novel. Other states have found the public
trust doctrine a useful tool to safeguard, if not enhance public
rights.
Montana is one of the states that has applied the public trust
doctrine to protect the public's access to waterways. The recent
decision of Montana Coalitionfor Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran,42 8 arose
because Curran, who owned land adjacent to the Dearborn River,
interferred with and harassed members of the public who used the
river.4 29 The court found the public trust to require that any surface
waters capable of recreational use may be so used by the public
without regard to streambed ownership. 430 Traditionally, the trust
only applied to waterways navigable under the federal title test.
Thus, Curran significantly broadens the resources entitled to
protection by the trust.
In Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission,43 1
Wisconsin denied the paper company a permit to build a dam on a
navigable creek.4 32 In Wisconsin a body of water may be navigable
even though it is not useful for commerce. 433
The paper company's ownership of land on both sides and
under the dam site was inconsequential because the State held the
water in trust and trust uses are paramount to the company's
private interests. 434 The Wyoming and Hawaii Supreme Courts
have determined that all their waters are held in trust by the State
for the benefit of the people, 435 and the California Supreme Court
426. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971) (interests pr~tected by the trust "include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use [the
waterway] for boating and general recreation purposes..., and to use the bottom of the navigable
waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.").
427. See United Plainsmen, 247 N.W.2d at 457.
428. 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
429. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 165 (Mont. 1984).
For a discussion of Curran, see Thorson, ForgingPublicRights in Montana's Waters, 6 PuB. LAND REV. 1,
29-33 (1985).
430. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984); see
also Gait v. State Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 913 (Mont. 1987) (statute
permitting public use upheld).
431. 201 Wis. 40, 228 N.W. 144 (1929).
432. Nekoosa Edwards Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 201 Wis. 40, -,
228 N.W. 144, 145

(1929).
433.
434.
435.
362 P.2d

Id. at-.,
228 N.W. at 147.
Id. at-.,
228 N.W. at 147.
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, __,
137, 145 (Wyo. 1961)

658 P.2d 287, 310 (1982); Day v. Armstrong,

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW'

[VOL. 64:7

has implicitly ruled that the trust covers all waters navigable for
recreation. 436 Cases such as these prepare the way for a North
Dakota ruling that the public trust doctrine, as it is understood in
North Dakota, requires that the public have full use of state
437
waters.
3. North Dakota Statutes
North Dakota statutes may be interpreted to allow recreational
use of all North Dakota waterways, even those over private
property. The most important statute is North Dakota Century
Code section 61-01-01.43 This statute provides that all waters in
watercourses and lakes belong to the public. 439 Public ownership of
water must, of course, carry with it certain rights. The bundle of
rights held by the people surely includes the right to canoe a river
they own and fish from a lake they own. It would be a strange
ownership were the public unable to make such fundamental,
nonconsumptive use of its waters.
Other states which have enacted laws like section 61-01-01
have interpreted them in court decisions concerning disputes
between landowners and recreationists. These decisions provide
fruitful guidance in predicting how section 61-01-01 might be
interpreted in similar situations. For example, a Utah statute
provides: "All waters in this state.. .are hereby declared to be the
property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use
thereof."440 The state of Utah used the statute to assert a public
recreational right in a lake surrounded by private land, the bed of
which seems to have been privately owned.4 4 1 The court, in
436. See Frank, supra note 25, at 620-21. (Frank stated that the California Supreme Court has
implicitly ruled that the trust covers all waters navigable for recreation in State v. Superior Court, 29
Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981)); see also National
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 435, 658 P.2d 709, 720 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356
n.17 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) "A waterway usable only for pleasure boating is
nevertheless a navigable waterway and protected by the public trust."). An Ohio decision, State v.
Newport Concrete Co., may also be interpreted as applying the trust to all recreationally useful waters,
44 Ohio App. 2d 121, __,
336 N.E.2d 453, 457-58 (Ct. App. 1975).
437. A commentator has written:
[Tihe courts appear ready to strain to apply public trust protection even though the
linkage to navigability [for title] may be tenuous... Thus, it would not be surprising to
see the navigability requirement dropped entirely by the courts in favor of a more
accurate and focused examination of the extent of the public's interest in the continued
use of a resource.

Thorson, supra note 429, at 13.
438. N.D. CENT. COoE S 61-01-01 (1985).
439. Id.
440.J.J.N.P. Co. v. State Div. ofWildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
441. Id.
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upholding public rights, stated: "A corollary of the proposition that
the public owns the water is the rule that there is a public easement
over the water regardless of who owns the waterbeds beneath the
water. ',442
Montana and Wyoming have constitutional provisions that
provide for all their waters to be public property. 4 4 3 The New
Mexico Constitution also provides for all their waters to be public
property.44 4 These provisions have been relied upon by the
supreme courts of these states to deny riparian landowners the right
to interfere with public use of waters flowing over private
property. 44 5 There is no reason to think the same conclusion would
not be reached by a North Dakota court interpreting the
declaration in section 61-01-01 that North Dakota waters "belong
to the public." ' 44 6 For, as the New Mexico Supreme Court stated:
"We find no place for a narrow construction of the language
whereby waters are declared 'to belong to the public'....".47
Other relevant North Dakota statutes include section 47-0115, which provides: "All navigable rivers shall remain and be
deemed public highways," 448 and section 42-01-01, which provides
that, "[a] nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act ... which ...
[u]nlawfully interfers with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or
442. Id.
443. See MONT. CONST. art. IX, S 3; WYo. CONST. art. VIII, S 1. Article IX, S 3 of the Montana
Constitution provides: "All surface.. .waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the
state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law."
MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3. Article ViII, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution provides: "The water of
all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the
state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state." WYo. CONST. art. VIII, S 1.
444. N.M. CONST. art. XVI, S 2. Article XVI, § 2 of the New Mexico Constitution provides:
"The unappropriated water of every natural stream... within the state of New Mexico, is hereby
declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use in accordance
with the laws of the state.....
Id.
445. See Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170-71 (Mont.
1984); State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, -,
182 P.2d 421, 426-27 (1945); Day v.
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145-47 (Wyo. 1961).
The Colorado Constitution provides: "The water of every natural stream, not heretofore
appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and
the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state." CoLo. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5. This
provision was interpreted as an expression of the people to preserve the appropriatiorn system of
water rights and not to allow public use of waters over private property. People v. Emmert, 198
Colo. 137,
-, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028-29 (1979). Article XI, S 3 of the North Dakota Constitution
provides: "All flowing streams and natural watercourses shall forever remain the property of the
state for mining, irrigating and manufacturing purposes." N.D. CONST.. art. XI, § 3. The North
Dakota Supreme Court has stated this provision "contemplates a limited property right for the
purposes of mining, irrigating, and manufacturing." State v. Brace, 76 N.D. 314,
-, 36 N.W.2d
330, 335 (1949). The provision, however, has never been interpreted in a case involving public rights
to use water over private land. Beck and Hart state that article XI, 5 3 of the North Dakota
Constitution should not be construed as disallowing beneficial uses other than the three mentioned in
the provision. If this is true, one of the uses might be public recreation. Beck & Hart, supra note 356,
at 276.
446. N.D. CENT. CODE S 61-01-01 (1985).
447. RedRiver Valley Co., 51 N.M. at-_.,
182 P.2d at 434.
448. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1978).
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renders dangerous for passage, any lake, navigable river,
bay, stream.... ,,449 The two statutes are similar. Each places
navigable rivers in the public domain for public use.
Unfortunately, the scope of the statutes is unclear because neither
defines "navigable," nor have courts interpreted the word as it is
found in these provisions. Without a definition, however, the door
is open for an advocate on behalf of public rights to argue that
"navigable" should be interpreted as it was by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Roberts, in which the court, in the context of a
property dispute held that a navigable waterway was one
450
susceptible to pleasure boating.

Finally, another North Dakota statute, section 61-01-26,
provides that the health and general welfare of the state's citizens
depends on "wise

utilization"

of all state water resources. 451

Although this statute is not a law, it is a significant policy
statement. 452 Recognizing that the public's health and welfare are
enhanced by recreation, 453 the "wise utilization" of the state's
water resources may entitle the public to use water over private
property.
4. Other Theories
Besides the public navigational easement, the public trust
doctrine, and North Dakota statutes, there may be other theories
upon which to support a public right to use waters over private
property. These theories are prescription, implied dedication, and
custom.

454

The drawback with- such theories is that none apply

unless particular facts are proven. For example, a prescriptive
4 55
easement to use water can only be acquired by continuous usage.
449. Id. S 42-01-01 (1983).
450. See Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 154, 181 N.W. 622, 626 (1921). For a discussion of
Roberts, see supra notes 111-16 and 407-11 and accompanying text.
451. N.D. CENT. ConE 5 61-01-26(1) (1985).
452. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457,460 (N.D. 1976).
453. See New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, -,
292
A.2d 580, 597-98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (the building of a public complex designed to
provide a facility for various athletic contests and other recreational activities promoted the general
public welfare by creating beneficial recreational activity, new commerce, new employment, and
generally making the community a better place in which to live), appeal dismissed sub noma., Borough of
East Rutherford v. New Jersey Sport & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972); Nekoosa Edwards
Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 201 Wis. 40, -,
228 N.W. 144, 147 (1929) (it is appropriate for
the state to establish a territory for wildlife so the public may benefit from recreational activities, such
as hunting and fishing, that it preserves).
454. For a discussion, of prescription, implied dedication, and custom, see 1 WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 234, at 225-31; Livingston, Public RecreationalRights in Illinois Rivers andStreams, 29 DE PAUL
L. REv. 353, 370 (1980); Parker, Fishingfrom the Bank: Public RecreationalRights Along Idaho's Rivers and
Lakes, 21 IDAHo. L. REv. 275, 286-301 (1985); Note, Fishing and Recreational Rights in Iowa Lakes and
Streams, 53 IowA L. REv. 1322, 1337-40 (1968).
455. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1065 (5th ed. 1979). Generally, to gain a prescriptive easement,
a right to use another's property which is not inconsistent with the owner's rights, there must be
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An implied dedication would require certain conduct on the part of
the landowner to show that he or she no longer reserved the
exclusive right to use the land. 456 Finally, a showing of custom
would require that an unvarying habit of the public has acquired
the force of law. 457 Extensive litigation would be required if these
theories were to open more than a few state waterways for public
use. Furthermore, the scope of the public's rights under the
theories would vary depending upon the circumstances that
establish their existence.
A more useful theory might be based on decisions like Johnson
v. Seifert. 458 This Minnesota case involved a small lake much of
which covered Seifert's land. 45 9 Though only a small part of the
lake covered Johnson's property, he used the entire surface of the
lake for recreation until Seifert built a fence through the lake on the
property line. 460 In ordering the fence removed, the court stated
that an abutting landowner of a lake suitable for recreation has a
right to use its entire surface in common with all other abutting
owners.4 6t The only condition on this right was that it be exercised
reasonably and that it not unduly interfere with the exercise of
4 62
similar rights by other littoral landowners.
open and notorious use, which is adverse and continuous for a specified period. Id.; see McGlone v.
Maynard, 303 Ky. 415,
-, 197 S.W.2d 918, 918 (Ky. Ct. App. 1946) (public can acquire right to
use a stream by prescription); State ex rel. Burnquist v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 123, 86 N.W.2d
278, 290-91 (1954) (public rights may be established by dedication, estoppel, or prescription). But see
State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140 ...
, 594 P.2d 1093, 1098 (1979) (the general public
cannot acquire prescriptive rights to private property).
456. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 371-72 (5th ed. 1979). An implied dedication is an appropriation
of land or an easement given by the landowner. Id. In the absence of a formal'declaration, an implied
dedication arises from facts and circumstances surrounding the case as well as the conduct of the
landowner. Id.; see County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 88 Cal. 3d 551,
-_, 605 P.2d 381, 389, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 886 (1981) (ocean beach impliedly dedicated to public use); Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2
Cal. 3d 29,
-,
465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (1970) (implied dedication of beach
found); State ex rel. Burnquist v. Bollenbach, 241 Minn. 103, 123, 83 N.W.2d 278, 290-91 (1954)
(public rights may be established by dedication); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763,
__
330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (city may impliedly dedicate beach to the public
at large); Cole v' Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 17 N.D. 409, 428, 117 N.W. 354, 361 (1908)
(common law doctrine of implied dedication adopted). But see Hailey v. Riley, 14 Idaho 81, __,
95
P. 686, 691 (1908) (implied dedications disapproved).
457. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 347 (5th ed. 1979). A longstanding habit may develop into a
custom with the force of law. Id.; see City of Daytona v. Tona-Roma, Inc., 294 So.2d 73, 78 (Fla.
1974) (custom established public's right to use beach); State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140,
__
594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (1979) (custom capable of establishing a public's right to use a, private
beach); State Game & Fish Comm'n v. Louis Fritz Co., 187 Miss. 539,
, 193 So. 9, 11 (1940)
(long public use of a stream may establish a public right to its waters); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,
254 Or. 584,-_., 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969) (custom established public's right to use beach).
458. 257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960).
459. Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 160-61, 100 N.W.2d 689, 691-92 (1960).
460. Id. at 160-61, 100 N.W.2d at 691-92.
461. Id. at 168-69, 100 N.W.2d at 696-97; see also Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791, 794-95 (Fla.
1959) (abutting landowner has right to use lake for recreation); Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659, 664,
23 N.W.2d 117, 119-20 (1946) (abutting landowner has the right to the use of the entire lake for
boating and fishing); Snively v.Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815,__,
296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1956) (abutting
landowner has right to use lake for recreation).
6
4 2.Johnson, 257 Minn. at 168-69, 100 N.W.2d at 696-97.
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The significance of this rule, for this Article, arises in
circumstances in which the state or its subdivisions own land
adjoining a nonnavigable (for title) waterway. The state could
license the public to use its riparian privileges, one of which is the
right, according toJohnson,. to use the entire surface. Courts have
approved of public use of water over private property when the
463
public is a licensee of a state riparian owner.
E.

THE-SCOPE OF THE-PUBLIC'S RECREATIONAL RIGHTS

While a number of courts and commentators have addressed
the question whether the public has the right to use waterways over
private property, there has been significantly less judicial and
scholarly comment upon the scope of such a right. This issue has
several aspects. It includes the question of exactly what recreational
uses the public may make of a waterway; the question whether the
public may use privately owned banks and beds; and the question
whether the public may use rivers that flow infrequently. What
follows is a selective discussion of the scope of the public right to use
waters over private property.
For the public navigational easement to attach it is
unnecessary

that a stream be free of obstructions 464 or flow
465

continuously.
Rivers boatable about nine months out of the year
have been impressed with the easement, 466 as have rivers boatable
about six months of the year. 467 The California Court of Appeal,

however, has stated that the navigational easement does not apply
to streams navigable during infrequent or brief periods of high or
flood waters, or for a few days during the rainy season. 468 While
such a limitation on the public interest may be proper under a
state's interpretation of the navigational easement, a different
result may be necessary if the public trust is the basis of the public
463. Beach v. Hayner, 207 Mich. 93,
-_, 173 N.W. 487, 489 (1919); Botton v. State, 69
Wash. 2d 751,
-, 420 P.2d 352, 365 (1966); Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash. 2d 815,
-, 296 P.2d
1015, 1019 (1956); see also Bartlett v. Stalker Lake Sportsmen's Club, 283 Minn. 393, 399-401, 168
N.W.2d 356, 360-61 (1969) (state ownership of riparian land is not a prerequisite to the public's
right to use the surface water when there is a publicly owned easement granting access to the water);
St. Lawrence Shores, Inc. v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 74,
-, 302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1969) (a state as riparian has the same rights and duties as a private riparian owner).
464. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, -,
238 P.2d 128, 135 (1951); State ex rel
Brown v. Newport Concrete Co., 44 Ohio App. 2d 121, _,
336 N.E.2d 453, 456-57 (1975).
465. Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 570-71, 127
Cal. Rptr. 830, 836-37 (1976); Kelley ex rel. MacMullan v. Hallden, 51 Mich. App. 176, -,
214
N.W.2d 856, 858 n.2 (1974); Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86 ....
76 N.W. 273, 276
(1896).
466. Hitchings, 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 570-71, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 837.
467. State v. McIlroy, 268 Ark. 227,
-, 595 S.W.2d 659, 661, 665 (1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 834 (1981); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137,140 (Wyo. 1961).
468. Hitchings, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 570, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
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right. Since the trust applies to all waters, it should not matter that
the waters run only occasionally. Existence of the trust is predicated
on the presence of water, not on a particular amount of water or the
season during which it flows. A similar result should be reached if
the public right of use is based on a statute like section 61-01-01 of
the North Dakota Century Code which provides for public
469 If the people hold title
ownership of water in lakes and streams.
to the water they should be entitled to use it wherever and
whenever it is susceptible to use, whether that only occurs after
heavy rains or during spring thaws.
On this subject of the scope of public rights in water over
private property, there is a curious rule in Michigan known as the
dead end lake rule.4 7 0 According to the rule, where there is a
navigable means to reach a lake, but the lake is small, has no outlet,
and its-banks are in private ownership, there is no public right to
use the lake. 47 1 Understanding the rationale for the dead end lake
rule requires knowledge of the purpose of Michigan's navigational
47 2 Highways begin
easement: to provide a highway of commerce.
and end. A lake without an outlet and surrounded by private
property is not a highway of commerce, but a dead end not subject
to public use. 47 3 Of course, the rule is inapplicable to states that
adopt the navigational easement on the basis of the importance of
recreational interests.
The incidents of the public right to use waters over private
47 4
land are typically held to include all general recreational uses.
Thus, they include such activities as boating, swimming, fishing,
skating, cross-country skiing, hunting, and snowmobiling.
Michigan, however, limits the incidents of the easement to boating
and fishing. 475 Recently, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in a
property title case, stated, in dicta, that the incidents of the public
trust included not only navigation, but also boating, swimming,
recreation, and fishing. 476
469. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 61-01-01 (1985).
-, 327 N.W.2d 838, 841
470. Bott v. Commission of Natural Resources, 415 Mich. 45,
N.W. 993 (1917)).
(1982) (citing Winans v. Willetts, 197 Mich. 512, _,163
471. Id. at __, 327 N.W.2d at 841.
327 N.W.2d at 845-46.
472. Id. at__,
473. Id. at __, 327 N.W.2d at 846.
474. E.g., People v. Sweetser, 72 Cal. App. 3d 278, 283, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (1977)
(permitted public use includes the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful
activity when using the water); J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d
1133, 1137 (Utah 1982) (same).
475. Bolt, 415 Mich. at -, 327 N.W.2d at 841. In Bolt the court stated: "Fishing is a quiet
sport. General boating and water recreation can, however, be intrusive and jarring." Id. at __,
327 N.W.2d at 843.
__
N.W.2d __,
476. J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., __
(N.D. 1988).
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When a recreationist's use of water over private property is
confined to the water there are few legal problems. When the
privately owned bed or bank is used, however, a trespass might
result. In general, a recreationist's incidental use of a riverbed by,
for example, unavoidably scraping or grounding a boat on the
bottom, or by disembarking to guide a boat over shoals or rapids, is
not a trespass.4 77 In Wyoming a persoh may not wade or walk a
stream privately owned because this is more than incidental use. 478
Conversely, in Missouri wading is permissible. 479 While attaching
traps or fish lines to a privately owned river bed is often held a
trespass, 480 a portage around obstructions does not constitute a
trespass. 4 81 Since, however, a portage uses private property, it must
be as unobstrusive as possible and the boater must reenter the
48 2
stream at the first place it is safe to do so.
A problem concerning the scope of public rights is public use
of a privately owned riverbank or lakeshore for purposes other
than portage. May a recreationist use banks and shores to repair a
boat, to rest, to picnic, and to camp? All such uses are related to the
purpose of the easement, and may even be considered necessary
uses if the right to the water is to be fully enjoyed. Yet, such uses
would significantly infringe upon rights of private property.
A similar issue has arisen with the nation's ocean beaches.
Beaches beyond the influence of the tides are often owned privately.
If the public is unable to cross the dry sand area it is deprived of its
use of the wet sand area and the ocean itself, each of which is a
public trust resource.
In addressing this issue, the NewJersey Supreme Court boldly
expanded the public trust doctrine. In Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Association, 483 the Association controlled the beaches
between the town of Bay Head and the Atlantic Ocean. 48 4 The
Association restricted access to the beach to residents of Bay Head
477. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145-46 (Wyo. 1961).
478. Id. at 146. For criticisms of the rule, see I WATER RIGHTS, supra note 234, at 217; Stone,
Legal Background on Recreational Use of Montana Waters, 32 MONT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971).
479. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835,
, 269 S.W.2d 17, 26 (1954).
480. Hall v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112,
57 N.W.2d 462, 464 (1953); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d
933, 936 (Okla. 1969); Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, __,
38
N.W.2d 712, 715 (1949).
481. Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, __,
528
P.2d 1295, 1297 (1974); Galt v. State ex rel. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 916
(Mont. 1987).
482. Southern IdahoFish &GameAss'n, 96 Idahoat __,528 P.2d at 1297.
483. 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). The case is discussed
in, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 344 (1985); Comment, Navigable Waters,
15 RUTGERS L.J. 813 (1984).
484. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306; -.,471 A.2d 355, 356 (1984).
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and their guests. 48 5 The New Jersey Supreme Court determined
that the public interest in tidal lands provided the people with the
corollary right to gain access to them through the Associationowned dry sand area and the right to use the dry sand area for rest
and recreation. 486 This latter right was necessary because
reasonable enjoyment of the wet sand and the ocean could not be
realized unless some use of the dry sand is also allowed. 4 7 Although
the Association was a quasi-public organization,4 8 the decision is
written in a manner that leaves little doubt its rules apply to
489
privately owned beaches.
Matthews delineates two principles. First, the public may cross
private property to reach a public trust resource if other routes are
unsafe or sufficiently inconvenient. 490 Second, the public may use
private property adjacent to a public trust resource when such use
is necessary for full enjoyment of the resources.4 9 1 These ideas have
obvious relevance to the public's use of inland public trust
resources. Thus far, however, courts have stated that crossing
private property to reach a lake or stream is a trespass. 492 Matthews,
however, at least when the public right to use a waterway is based
on the public trust doctrine, is authority for a different result.
There is little authority on what use the public may make of
privately owned river banks and lake shores, but the tenor of public
use cases, is that the use is severely restricted. Recent Montana
decisions, however, may signal a change because they follow the
reasoning of Matthews.
In Montana the public may use all waters that are capable of
recreational use. This rule is based on the Montana Constitution
and the public trust doctrine.4 93 Significantly, this public right is
not confined to the water. It "includes the right of use of the bed
and banks up to the high-water mark even though the fee title in the
485. Id. at-.,
471 A.2d at 356.
486. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, -,
471 A.2d 355, 364-66
(1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). The court previously determined that the public had a right
to use the dry sand area with regard to beaches owned by a municipality. Van Ness v. Borough of
Deal, 78 N.J. 174,
-_, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (1978); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avonby-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296,
-, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (1972).
487. Matthews, 95 N.J. at -. , 471 A.2d at 365. These rights are, however, not unrestricted. Id.
at -_ , 471 A.2d at 370.
488. Id. at - , 471 A.2d at 368.
489. See Note, supra note 483, at 365. The Matthews decision, while dealing with public use rights
on quasi-public beach property, impacts heavily on private ownership rights since the great majority
of the beach was privately owned. Id.
490. Id. at 366.
491. Id.
492. E.g., Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 172 (Mont.
1984) (public does not have right to enter or cross over private property to reach public water bodies
even when such waters are held open for recreational uses).
493. Id. at 170.
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land resides with the adjoining landowners.' ,494 While the extent of
the uses to which this private land may be made remain
undefined, 495 they must have minimal effect on the land and must
relate to the use of the water. 496 Furthermore, the public is not
entitled to a use of these lands that is as convenient, productive,
and comfortable as possible. 497 More specifically, the Montana
court has stated the public had no right to big game hunting on
private land nor the right to construct permanent improvements
such as duck blinds. 498 In some instances, however, the public has
499
the right of overnight camping.
Once a state decides the public may use water over private
property, it must then resolve the many questions relating to the
extent and scope of this right. How the questions are answered
depends on a court's philosophical view of public interests that
impose themselves upon private interests. On the one hand, the
public right should not "be limited or curtailed by narrow
constructions. It should be interpreted in the broad and beneficent
spirit that gave rise to it in order that the people may fully enjoy the
intended benefits. ' 5 0 0 Yet, courts must take care to narrowly
confine the easement so that the effect of the public use of beds and
banks owned by private individuals is minimal.5 0 1 "The real
property interests of private landowners are important as are the
public's property interests in water. "502
Opponents to a legislative initiative to statutorily protect and
enhance public use of all state waters are likely to be farmers and
ranchers, a group not without influence in North Dakota. But some
of their concerns can be met without sacrificing public rights. The
landowner's worry about being personally liable for an injury to a
recreationist is perhaps largely cured by chapter 53-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code entitled "Liability Limited for Owner of
Recreation Lands." Pursuant to this chapter, a landowner is
subject to liability only if the landowner charges a fee for the use of
his or her land, or willfully or maliciously fails to guard against a
dangerous condition or activity. 50 3 If this law is inadequate a better
one can be enacted.

3d

494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
101,

Galt v. State ex re. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 915-16.
145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914).
Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, __,
Galt, 731 P.2dat916.
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 53-08-05 (1982); see also Charpentier v. Von Geldern, 191 Cal. App.
-,
236 Cal. Rptr. 233, 236 (1987) (landowner's duty to nonpaying, uninvited
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Another concern of landowners is the right to maintain fences
through streams, which is commonly done to manage livestock.
Under each of the three theories presented above that establish a
public recreational right to use waters, fences are unlawful. The
problem, however, is subject to compromise. Fences might be
allowed if the landowner installs gates either in the stream or on the
bank and provides a safe and convenient route of portage to and
504
from the gate.
An important concern of landowners is the loss of solitude due
to public use, as well as the irritations the public brings with them
wherever they go in even small numbers. Yet, as the Arkansas
Supreme Court stated, "[W]e can no more close a public waterway
because some of those who use it annoy nearby property owners,
than we can close a public highway for similar reasons. 5 0 5 If the
public's use of a waterway becomes too obnoxious, government has
the power to regulate the use and protect landowners.
IV. CONCLUSION
Water is a gift of nature. No man or woman created or
discovered it. Besides being a necessity of life, water benefits the
public in many ways. The aesthetics of a stream and lake .can be
profound. Cross-country skiing on a frozen river, canoeing on a
tree-lined stream, or fishing in a bay brings pleasure and makes life
satisfying. Such a bounty of nature cannot be placed in the hands of
a few to decide which select persons may use and enjoy it. Water,
like the sunlight, must be shared and be made available to anyone
wishing to discover its pleasures.
North Dakota law inadequately protects the public's interest
in water. This is no fault of the judiciary for it has not had an
opportunity to protect the public. It is not rash to predict that
North Dakota courts will, when presented the opportunity, uphold
public recreational rights in waters over private property. Several
theories to do so are available. Decisions from other states doing so
rccreahionist is not greater than common law duty owed to a trespasser, and such landowner is not
liable
for any injuries, other than those caused by the landowner's willful or malicious misconduct).
504. The idea for this compromise came from the decision in Gaston v.Mace. Gaston v. Mace, 33
W.Va. 14, __
10 S.E. 60 (1889). Gaston owned both sides of Stone Coal Creek. Id. at __, 10
S.E. at 60. A milldam connected the banks of his property and supplied water to power Gaston's
mill. Id. at -, 10 S.E. at 60. Upstream- from the dam Mace had put logs in the creek. Id. at
I,
10 S.E. at 61. They collected behind the dam until the dam broke and the logs floated to market.
Gaston sought recovery for the damages to his dam and business but the court said the dam was a
public nuisance. Id. at -,
10 S.E. at 62. The court, however, stated the mill dams may still
remain on streams provided they contain sluices or other means to accommodate sawlog traffic. Id.
at -. , 10 S.E. at66.
505. State v. Mcllroy, 268 Ark. 227, -, 595 S.W.2d 659, 665 (1981).
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provide enlightenment. Moreover, North Dakota decisions
themselves, as well as statutes, point toward protection of public
interests. It would be unwise, however, to wholly rely on the
judiciary to champion public interest. The judicial response is ad
hoc and questions may remain unresolved for many years. On the
other hand,
the legislature
can act immediately and
0
6
comprehensively.
It also provides a forum to readily refine a law
if in practice its goal is not achieved.
Besides the issue of recreational use of waterways, the
legislature might also consider some questions of title. One of these
50 7
concerns section 47-01-15 of the North Dakota Century Code.
The statute gives to riparians the area between low and high-water
mark on rivers and lakes that are navigable for title purposes. 50
This gift of state land is of doubtful legality and the statute should
be clarified. Another timely question of title is that of state
ownership of river beds. State ownership of river beds would ease
construction of water projects, enhance recreational opportunities,
and may increase state mineral revenues. North Dakota, however,
has not asserted title to more than a few of its river beds. In light of
modern decisions easing a state's burden to prove its title under the
federal navigability for title test, it is an opportune time to consider
claims of bed ownership.
Water, because of its scarcity, its importance to nature, its
transient character, and the myriad of uses to which it is put, will
always be subject to the demands of an array of interests. This
Article examined one such water problem, the public's recreational
use of waters over private property and several questions of water
boundaries and title intimately related to public recreational rights.
North Dakota, at the first opportunity, should take its place
alongside those states that have bettered the lives of their citizens by
enhancing opportunities to enjoy rivers and lakes.

506. Wisconsin and Idaho have adopted statutes specifying the rights of public navigation. See
IOAHOCODE § 36-1601 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. S 30.10 (West 1973 & Supp. 1987).
507. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 47-01-15'(1978).
508. Id.

